LINDSAY. Cowdenbeath, Fife. 14th. December, 1957.

The Lindsay Colliery was at Kelty, about two miles north of Cowdenbeath. It had been in production since 1875 and at the time of the disaster comprised one vertical shaft and two surface mines. Coal was raised through the shaft and No.1 Surface Mine and the No.2 Surface Mine was used for ventilation and man-riding. At the date of the disaster the output from the colliery was about 1,100 tons a day, of which 400 tons came from the Glassee Seam. Seven hundred and ninety men were employed below ground and 170 in the surface.

The Colliery was in the West Fife Area of the Scottish Division of the National Coal Board and the principal officers were Mr. G. Milin, Area General Manager, Mr. J. Hutchinson, Area Production Manager, Mr. R.B. Dunn, Deputy Area Production Manager (Operations), Mr. J.C.B. Haynes, Group Manager and Mr. W. Reid as the Manager of the colliery. There were two undermanagers, Mr. W. Orr who was in charge of the workings of the No.1 Surface Mine and Mr. A. Bell who was in charge of the remaining underground workings.

The mine was worked in three shifts. In the Glassee Seam coal was filled on the day and afternoon shifts during alternate weeks, the deputies changing with their men. The night shift deputies, however, remained permanently on that shift and so for one week had the first preparatory shift and the following week the second preparatory shift.

The seam that had been worked in the life of the colliery were, in descending order, the Little Splint, Seven Feet, Main Coal, Upper Jersey, Lower Jersey, Low Bank, Glassee, Mynheer, Five Feet and Dunfermline Splint. At the time of the explosion, the Seven Feet and Glassee Seams and development in the Mynheer Seam were being worked from the shaft, and the Little Splint and Jersey Seam from No.1 Surface Mine. There had been an ignition of gas at the colliery on the 4th. May 1955, which injured two men and before that one man had been fatally injured in an explosion in 1930. The mine was worked by locked safety lamps. The workmen used Oldham Wheat electric cap lamps, type GW and the deputies were provided with Wolf flame lamps, types 7 RMBS and 7S, for the use of the statutory inspections. In November 1955, 73 workmen were trained to recognise gas caps on flame lamps with a view to compliance to statutory regulations governing the use of firedamp detectors. Workmen employed in development sections carried flame lamps for this purpose, but they were not used elsewhere. Not a single detector was in use in the No. 3 Unit at the time of the explosion.

The explosive used in the mine was “Unigel Eq.S.”. Shots were fired by No.6 low-tension detonators and Davis-Derby single shot exploders. The system of searching for contraband was approved by the Divisional Inspector and required that 10 per cent of the men forming a shift should be searched and that there should be a general search at quarterly intervals. All persons descending the mine other than on a shift were to be searched on each occasion. In addition, it was the practice to search a proportion of men at the deputies meeting station and surprise spot checks were made.

The ventilation of the mine was by the shaft and No.1 Surface mine which served as intakes and the No.2 Surface mine was the return. Ventilation was provided by an axial flow exhausting fan designed to deliver 125,000 cubic feet of air per minute at a water gauge of 2.5 inches. This was operated at 1000,000 cubic feet per minute at a water gauge of 2.1 inches.

The workings in the Glassee Seam comprised two advancing longwall single-unit faces called Nos. 3 and 4 Units. They were at a depth of 1,260 feet below the surface. They were worked in conjunction with a development in the Mynheer Seam, 60 feet below the Glassee No.3 Unit which was started when No.2 unit was stopped in April, 1957 and No.4 Unit was started when No.1 Unit was stopped in September, 1957. The approach to these workings was through Hodge’s Mine, stone drift, 1,650 yards long dipping at 1 in 11 and then through a level cross-measure drift 635 yards long. Coal from the faces was transported by a gate conveyor to a common loading point and from there in tubs by endless-rope haulage through Hodge’s Mine to the pit bottom. Hodge’s Mine formed the main intake airway from the area. The main return airway through Wilson’s Mine to No.2 Surface Mine. Until the end of October 1957 these two Units were ventilated in series, air travelling around the No.3 and then round the no.4 Unit. Following the completion of an overcast in October, separate splints were provided for each Unit. Before the separation, the quantity of air measured in No.3 Unit main gate was approximately 5,000 cubic feet per minute. On 2nd November, after the separation, the quantity measured was 4,422 cubic feet per minute, while in the No.4 Unit main gate it was 6,120 cubic feet per minute.

The explosion occurred in the No.3 Unit. The face was 120 yards long and was advancing across the line of the true dip. The gradient of the face was 1 in 3.3, dipping from the main intake gate towards the tailgate. The gates rose towards the face at a gradient varying from 1 in 4 to 1 in 5. The seam was about 3 feet 6 inches thick and as overlain by a blaes roof. The unit was bordered on the rise side by the abandoned No.2 Unit the waste of which was contacted from time to time, and on the dip side, by a fault from which ran igneous intrusions. There was “burnt” coal from these intrusions in the lower part of the face. The face was supported by a mixture of wood and steel props set to corrugated bars. Intermediate packs were built and chocks were set along the edge of the waste to facilitate caving. Wet cutting was practice, the coal being undercut by machine to a depth of four feet six inches and hand loaded on to a bottom loading belt conveyor which conveyed it uphill to the main gate. In the main gate a short scraper conveyor carried the coal to the main belt conveyor.

The ventilating air entered No.3 Unit through the main gate and after passing down the face and through the tail gate, left by a return common to No.3 and 4 Units. Air sampling was regularly carried out and the highest firedamp content recorded before the separation was in the tailgate on 4th October 1957 at 0.39 per cent. No samples were taken in the wastes but a few tests were made at the waste edge by holding a flame lamp at arm’s length into the waste. The machinery at the coal face was electrically driven and included the gate and face conveyors, coal cutters, drills and pumps.

One hundred and seventy-four men were employed underground on the night of the 13th/14th December 1957 when the explosion took place. Of those in the Glassee Seam, 13 men were employed in the No.3 Unit, under the charge of Robert Cook, deputy and William Masterson, overman both of whom were killed in the explosion. In No.4 Unit there were 16 men in the charge of Robert Smith, deputy. The work in No.3 Unit was to cut the face, brush the bottom gate and withdraw the supports from the waste. In No.4 Unit the work was that of the first preparatory shift.

When the men arrived at the No.3 Unit there seems to have been some difficulty in starting the brushing of the bottom road because loose coal and inability to get the face belt to run. The coal cutting machine was also held up for the same reason. By 2 a.m., however, the coal cutting machine had cut out the bottom corner and had passed the gate. Soon afterwards Cook, the deputy, is said to have fired three brushing shots. The brushers then cleared up, erected a girder and began packing dirt on the high side of the road. By 3 a.m., waste drawing had been completed and at about 3.30, the deputy asked one of the workmen. S. Fitzsimmons, to help tighten the face belt and get it running for the day shift. He then proceeded to do this, when in his own words, “the next thing I knew was a man lying on top of me.” This was at 4 a.m. and W. McAughey and R. Condie were on the No.3 Unit said they were blown over by hot air and dirt and that the air was thick with black smoke. W. Fleetham and W. Monaghan were blown over but saw on flame. Another man said, “There was no terrific neat, just warm air.

The men working in the Mynheer Development did not hear anything but shortly after 4 a.m. They were told by Fleetham that something had happened in the No.3 Unit. Five of them, accompanied by another man from the No.4 Unit, immediately set off to see if they could rescue any of the man affected. They were unable to approach the Unit by the intake because of dust and fumes. David O’Donnell and Alex Moyes managed to enter the return airway and reach the face. They saw the bodies of T. Johnstone, J. Hughes, and D. Anderson and then they had to retreat. On the way down the face they met Davy Scott and Robert Muirhead and returned up the face with them. They were followed later by R. McCartney and Edward Tungate. O’Donnell and Moyes were soon overcome and had to be helped out by Muirhead and Tungate. Scott was then overcome, Muirhead did his best to help him out but fond it physically impossible and had to make his own escape. Scott’s body was later recovered.

On his way to the Mynheer Development, Fleetham had telephoned the surface to report the explosion. A.M. Sneddon, the deputy in the Mynheer Development had also phoned to inform the manager and summon the Rescue Brigades. The messages were passed on to the manager W. Ried at his home. He tried, without success to phone the Cowdenbeath rescue Station by way of the Area Office so he telephoned J.C.B. Haynes at his home at 4.10 a.m. and asked him to get the Rescue Brigades. The message was passed on at 4.35 a.m. The manager arrived at the pit about 4.25 a.m. and was soon joined by other National Coal Board Officials. All men not needed for rescue operations were withdrawn from the mine and it was found that nine were unaccounted for.

The Rescue Superintendent and two assistants arrived at the colliery with equipment at 4.40 a.m. The Station did not have a permanent Rescue Brigade of its own and a brigade had to be made from the trained rescue workers who worked at the colliery. At 5.30 a.m. a team was ready to go underground. Ten minutes were spent receiving instructions from the Coal Board Officials and the first team went down at 5.40 a.m. They established afresh air base just beyond the loading point at a place called the Old No.1, about one and a half miles inbye. They were followed by the Group Manager who took charge of the operations underground. The manager remained in charge at the surface.

The team left the air base about 6.40 a.m. and made a complete circuit of the affected district, stating in the return side and they had no difficulty in getting along the road to the face, though it was rather warm and the visibility was only twelve yards. During this operation they located the bodies of the nine missing men, all of whom were dead. About ten yards beyond the coal cutter they discovered a whole unsmoked cigarette lying on the ground at the foot of a prop. They found no other contraband and arrived back at the air base at 7.20 a.m.

Efforts were being made to restore the ventilation and temporary repairs were made to the overcast which had been slightly damaged by the explosion. Sheets were erected to divert as much air as possible to clear the district so that it could be entered without breathing apparatus. This was done by 9.20 a.m.

Those killed were:

  • Daniel Anderson aged 42 years, machineman,
  • Robert Cook aged 64 years, deputy,
  • John Hughes aged 37 years, machineman,
  • Thomas Johnstone aged 39 years, packer,
  • William Masterson aged 55 years, overman,
  • William McCulloch aged 55 years, packer,
  • Hugh McPherson aged 43 years, machineman,
  • Bernard Pietrik aged 32 years, beltman and
  • David Scott aged 53 years, developer.

Those injured:

  • Robert Condie aged 42 years, brusher,
  • Samuel Fitzsimmons aged 49 years, prop drawer,
  • William Fleetham aged 35 years, back brusher,
  • James Hutchinson aged 49 years, brusher,
  • William McAughey aged 58 years, repairer,
  • Robert McGuiness aged 21 years, brusher,
  • William Monaghan aged 20 years, back brusher,
  • Jan Nitsch aged 35 years, brusher,
  • John Rowley aged 49 years, haulage operator,
  • David Smith aged 35 years, brusher and
  • Robert Smith aged 53 years, deputy.

The inquiry which lead to the report of the circumstances and causes of the disaster was conducted by Sir Harold Roberts, C.B.E., M.C., B.Sc., and presented to The Right Honourable Lord Mills, K.B.E., Minister of Power in August 1958.

After the disaster the area was inspected by Mr. F.S. Pollard, H.M. Senior District Inspector of Mines and Quarries and representatives of all other interested parties. The only trace of firedamp was in a roof cavity at the extreme left-hand corner of the face. There were only a few signs of visible violence at the outbye end of the No.3 main gate, the gearhead of the gate conveyor had been moved about 2 feet inbye and further inbye the conveyor structure had been moved. The air crossing at the No.4 intake gate was also damaged.

The waste drawing seemed to have been completed and there was a Sylvester lying in the No.2 waste. The main haulage rope on the coal cutter had been newly extended and the control handle was in a position normally used for inching which suggested that they were tightening the rope at the time of the explosion. A drilling cable was seen to be hanging on hooks in the tail gate about 15 yards back from the face. There was also a deputy’s re-lighter lamp hanging up in that gate. Shot firing exploders and shot firing cables were found hanging up in both gates and in various places Mr. Pollard found a total of 15 four-ounce cartridges of explosives, some cut in half-concealed under stones.

A further inspection was made the following morning by Mr. C. Sharpe, H.M. District Inspector of Mines and Quarries and Mr. W. Linton, overman. They searched specifically for anything that might have cause the ignition of gas. They started at the intake road of the No.3 Unit and at the third refuge hole they found a spent match and others along the intake road inbye and cigarette butts on the roadway. On the face they found a spent match at the foot of the No.4 pack. This was near the place that the rescue brigade found a whole cigarette and he found butts in abundance and an empty cigarette packet in the return road.

When the bodies of the men were brought to the surface, police officers examined their clothing and in three cases found contraband:

1)  an empty cigarette packet another packet containing a partly smoked cigarette another party smoked cigarette and three spent and four live matches:

2)  a cigarette packet containing one cigarette one loose cigarette and three matches and

3)  a small tin containing a partly smoked cigarette.

Sir Harold Roberts came to the following conclusions:

1) the initial cause of the explosion was the ignition of firedamp on No.3 Unit by a match struck for the purpose of smoking.

2) the firedamp came from the waste in the vicinity of No.3 Pack over a relatively short period, probably as the result of strata movement following drawing off operations.

3) owing to the layout, inclination and system of ventilation, the velocity of the air was not high enough to prevent the accumulation of a dangerous quantity of gas even if the rate of emission was only moderate.

4) the primary explosion of firedamp was extended along the intake gate by the explosion of coal dust derived mainly from the transfer point and from the conveyor and

5) it was common knowledge that smoking was widely practised.

The Inspector made the following recommendations:

1).      (a) before deciding on the system of ventilation for a steeply inclined face, a careful analysis should be made of the particular circumstances. The National Coal Board should issue instructions to this effect, together with advice about the factors involved and the precautions to be taken.

(b) Conditions on such faces now in operation should be reviewed on the same basis.

2).     (a) The National Coal Board should investigate the way in which their directive dealing with dust barriers is carried out, and should take the opportunity of reminding all management of the need to minimise the deposition of coal dust on conveyor roads, and to clear up systematically any that may accumulate.

(b) The National Coal Board should consider whether the terms of their directive on dust barriers are still appropriate, having regard to recent work on the operation of such barriers.

3).     (a) The National Union of Mineworkers should combine locally and nationally to devise means of ensuring that workmen use firedamp detectors.

(b) All officials in the line of management should be required to carry firedamp detectors when visiting parts of the mine to which Part III of the Coal and Other Mines (Ventilation) Regulations, 1956, applies.

4) Although the jettisoning of explosives is not causally connected with this explosion, the practice is potentially dangerous and efforts to stop it should be intensified. In particular, cross-checking of the various statutory records should be enforced.

5) Provision for snap searches, i.e. searches carried out in the mine working without warning, should be incorporated in every system approved under Section 66 (2) of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954.

6) Finally, I will repeat what I said at the end of the Inquiry: I must join in the appeals about contraband. The practice of smoking in safety lamp mines is not confined to Lindsay. The people who indulge in it are not being brave or clever but are, in fact, showing an utterly irresponsible, callous and selfish disregard for their lives of their fellows and the happiness of friends and relations. The possible consequences are so appalling that I appeal to the whole of the mining community, management, Unions, officials, workmen, and if I may, to their womenfolk, to try to stamp out this evil practice.

 

REFERENCES
The Report of the causes and the circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at the Lindsay Colliery, Fifeshire on the 14th December 1957 by Sir Harold Roberts, C.B.E., M.C., B.Sc.
The Lindsay Colliery Disaster. The Scottish Area of the National Union of Mineworkers.
Colliery Guardian, 20th March, p.1958, p.366, 21st August, p.236

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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