CLAY CROSS. Chesterfield, Derbyshire. 11th. June, 1861.

The colliery was the property of William Jackson and Partners. The late Mr. G. Stevenson had given instructions to the Mr. Martin, who was now dead, to take care when working the coal in the area as it was known that there were workings that had been made about twenty-three years before the disaster.

In 1848 the No.1 Pit stopped getting coal and the Black Shale Ironstone was opened. This was 23 yards above the former. The extension of the workings down the outcrop let more water down the pit than the pump could lift and the water backed up in the old No.1 workings. At the time of the breach on 11th June 1861, there was 14 yards of water in the No.1 pit and a head of 24 yards at the breach.

When the pit was working, there were 249 men and 71 boys employed with 17 men in the roads and airways. On the north side of the mine there were four day deputies and five day deputies on the south side. There was also a day overman and night overman and two night deputies who were under the direction of John Parker, the underviewer.

The No.2 pits were sunk in 1839 under Mr. Stevenson’s direction and both shafts were tubbed. The Main or Black Shale coal in these pits was found free from water and Mr. Stevenson decided to have no communication with the old pits with the objective of keeping about the water. In 1851, the Clay Cross works were purchased by William Jackson, M.P., Sir Morton Peto, M.P. Sir Joshua Walmesley and E.L. Betts. Mr. Binns was appointed manager and he confirmed the views that had been put forward by Mr. Stevenson that the pit should not communicate, but before the No.2 workings approached near the No.1, Mr. Binns was anxious to correct the plan. The whole of the No.2 workings were surveyed and a new plan was made. He had confidence in the plans of the No.1 workings and at first, he decided to leave a barrier of 20 yards of coal between the two and he intended to make a borehole towards the old workings. He had so much confidence in the old plans and weighed up the difficulty in making boreholes and plugging them, he decided to leave a barrier of forty yards and dispense with the boring.

Five headings had been driven according to Mr. Martin’s information and a tunnel had been constructed on the level, along the extremity of the headings. This was surveyed and laid on the plan. Martin was a competent manager and he had been instructed to get the coal up to thirty yards of the boundary but Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Binns were away from the mine for weeks at a time.

When this work was completed Mr. Binns who was the manager of the colliery, The end of the colliery was near the Black Shale No.1 and Nathaniel Dawes was working at the face, up Dan’s incline on the south side of the No.2 pits when he noticed a little wet in his stall while he was holing at the bottom of the coal. it was not unusual for there to be water in these stalls.

Dawes left work about 3 p.m., a short time before the regular time, and went down Dan’s incline to tell Timothy Smith, a son of the deputy of the district and his father about the water. The boy was occupied on the incline brake and could not go to tell his father. Dawes, instead of going to tell Smith himself, left the pit, which was against the Special Rules of the Colliery.

At the time of the disaster, there were 63 men and 23 boys on the north side and 39 men and 32 boys on the south side. About 5 p.m. Alfred Smith, the deputy of the district in which the breach occurred, came to his son who had been told of the wet by Dawes, The son said he had to run one set down the incline when another tub arrived and then he had finished his work. Together they heard a noise which Alfred thought was some tubs coming along the incline. They listened for a moment and he thought the noise was roaring water, coming from Dawes’ stall.

Alfred Smith ordered his son out of the pit and to tell the same to everyone he met on his way out. By great exertions Smith got the men out safely. His son told the deputy he met on the south side and they went quickly to tell the men on the north side. The deputies on the north side got the men out but there was an oversight, they forgot to warn the three men and a boy working in the stone headings which were bring driven from the north side of the No.2 pit to the Tupton coal, 60 yards above the main coal. The levels rose to the mouth of these headings and the headings rose half an inch to the yard for 400 yards so the pit bottom would be sealed before they were aware of the water.

The deputies on the south side did not act as quickly as those on the north side and they sent boys to tell the men in the workings to get out. Fifteen men and boys working in the Britton and Wood’s district did not escape as well as three in the Silkstone District. From the evidence given at the inquiry, it was clear that they did receive a warning.

A man named Slater who was working at the far end of the south side was the last to come out. He had passed some of the men when he came to water at the foot of Dan’s incline where he found several men who were afraid to go through the water. He stepped in and urged the others to follow him expecting that they did so, but on getting to the No.2 ventilation door near the shafts, he looked around and found that none were following him. At the door, he met E. Forrester, George Mills, Siddens, Brunt and others were trying to open the door to get to the downcast shaft but it would not open because of the rubbish that had washed against it. Slater asked them to follow him to the upcast shaft but they did not do so. He escaped and the others died in the mine and he was the last to see them alive.

When John Parker, the underviewer, heard of the accident, we went immediately to the pit and descended. By this time the downcast shaft which was three foot six inches lower than the upcast, had water almost to the roof. Parker, John Brown, the officials and a large number of men, tried to get the trapped men out of the mine. Some of the rescuers broke down the brickwork at the No.2 separation door and there they found a youth named Bounce.

Bounce had been left at the far end of the south side for a quarter of an hour after the others had left since he had received no warning of the imminent danger. He waited for some time for an empty tram but the trammers did not return and he thought it was time to end his work. He got dressed and struggled through the water to the door and he had just arrived there when the brickwork was knocked out.

The men on the south side and were killed, were at the place fifteen minutes before Bounce. It was supposed that the men went down the level when Slater left them, they went along the level and joined the men and boys at the foot of Dan’s incline down which the water was a rushing torrent.

After the escape was cut off there was a route through the furnace drift which entered the upcast shaft eight yards from the bottom and went to the seam fifty yards on the rise side of the shaft. Water was poured down this drift to cool it but no one could get into it against the stream of water and no one escaped by this route.

When Mr. Hedley, the Inspector arrived at the colliery between 8 and 9 p.m. he found that the water was up to the furnace drift. Preparations were being made to recover the bodies by drawing water and making a connection from other workings. The bodies were removed from the mine twenty two days later.

The men were entombed in the No.2 Black Shale Pit for 22 days and were suffocated. Four bodies were found at the foot of the No.1 incline on the north side, thirteen at the foot of Dun’s incline on the south side, five near the foot of the horse road on the south side and one on the back level at the far end of the south side.

*Those who died were:

  • Francis Bradley aged 35 years miner.
  • Joseph Wilbraham. aged 25 years, a miner.
  • Joseph Vernon aged 27 years, miner.
  • William Holmes aged 13 years, trammer.
  • Samuel Coates aged 33 years, miner.
  • John Carr a miner aged 26 years.
  • Thomas Wood aged 60 years, miner.
  • Joseph Wood, aged 35 years, miner.
  • Alexander Bettison aged 44 years, miner.
  • Eli Forrester aged 45 years, miner.
  • Thomas Street aged 67 years, miner.
  • George Mills aged 25 years, miner.
  • John Buxton aged 61 years, miner.
  • John Butterfield aged 14 years, trammer.
  • Reuben Jones aged 13 years, trammer.
  • John Ashmore aged 13 years, trammer.
  • Samuel Ashmore, aged 21 years, miner.
  • Richard Siddons aged 40 years, miner.
  • Thomas Brunt aged 32 years, miner.
  • John Hill aged 41 years, miner.
  • Joseph Cook aged 67 years, miner.
  • Joseph Hawley aged 45 years, miner.

The fourteen widows and the thirty-two children who were left without fathers were provided for. Ten of the children could earn their own living and Mr. Jackson on behalf of the Clay Cross Company offered to make provision for the dependants. Many gentlemen of the Count subscribed and a fund of £2000 was raised, headed with £500 from the firm. This was considered sufficient to provide a widow without children 8/- to 9/- per week and she was given coals and a widow with children was allowed from 12/- to 14/- per week again with coal given.

The Inspector, Mr. Hedley made an examination of the mine and found a hole sixteen inches wide and eight inches deep in the parting between the top and bottom coal in a narrow pointed corner of a heading which was four feet six inches in. It was thought that Martin was driving this heading as a lodge for water until he worked the coal for a short distance. After that the goaf would hold the water that drained from the coal.

Mr. Hedley commented:

The Fifteenth General Rule states that sufficient boreholes shall be kept in advance and if necessary on both sides, to prevent inundations in every working approaching place likely to contain a dangerous accumulation of water.

Mr. Binns had complete confidence in the old plans and felt secure in leaving a barrier of forty yards of coal and not to bore would put the mine in no danger. It was obvious that boreholes should have been made.

Mr. Hedley concluded his report:

From this accident we learn two important lessons, viz. that extreme accuracy is necessary in laying down upon a plan every detail of the workings of a mine and secondly the necessity, where two shafts are upon or near the same level, in inclined seams, for an outlet on the rise, or communications with the workings on the rise side of the shafts, and the shafts some distance above the bottom, as a means of escape.

 

REFERENCES
The Mines Inspectors Report 1861. Mr. Hedley.
The Colliery Guardian, 15th June. p.378. 22nd June. p.394. 13th July. p.21, 26. 20th July. p.37. 10th August. p.85, 88.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

*Thank you to Emily Crocker for supplying this updated list from her research. As some of the names/ages are different to the original list we had, this is reproduced below for completeness:

F. Bradley aged 35 years miner. S. Wilbraham. aged 25 years, a miner. Joseph Vernon aged 27 years, miner. William Holmes aged 13 years, trammer. S. Coates aged 33 years, miner. John Carr a miner aged 26 years. Thomas Wood aged 60 years, miner. Joseph Wood, aged 35 years, miner. A. Bettison aged 44 years, miner. E. Forrester aged 45 years, miner. Thomas Street aged 69 years, miner. George Mills aged 25 years, miner. John Buxton aged 38 years, miner. John Butterfield aged 14 years, trammer. R. Jones aged 13 years, trammer. John Ashmore aged 13 years, trammer. Samuel Ashmore, aged 21 years, miner. R. Siddons aged 40 years, miner. Thomas Brunt aged 32 years, miner. John Hill aged 41 years, miner. Joseph Cook aged 50 years, miner. Joseph Hawley aged 60 years, miner.

 

 

Return to previous page