MARKHAM. Markham, Derbyshire. 21st. January, 1937.

The colliery was one of three owned by the Staveley Coal and Iron Company Limited and was five miles from Chesterfield. Mr. John Hunter was the General Manager for the Companies collieries, Mr. R. Ringham was the Agent and Mr. L.W. Limb was the Manager of the Markham Colliery. There were four shafts at the colliery, Nos. 1 and 2 were the downcast and Nos. 3 and 4 were the upcasts. Four seams were worked and the coal from the Blackshale in which the explosion occurred was wound at the No.1 shaft. The colliery employed 1,828 people below ground and 410 on the surface. The ventilation was produced by two Waddle Fans, one at the top of the No.3 shaft and the other at the No.4 shaft. The last recorded readings prior to the disaster was 189,500 cubic feet per minute of air circulating in all the seams and for the Blackshale Seam, there were 66,200 cubic feet per minute. Safety lamps were used throughout the mine and at the face electric hand lamps were used and in accordance with the General regulations (Firedamp Detectors) of 1st. May 1935 a proportion of the men were provided with lamps and “Ringrose” automatic firedamp detectors. The colliery was fully mechanised with the coal cutters and conveyors were driven by electricity. Shotholes were drilled by compressed air machines.

The Blackshale Seam was in the No.2 Development Unit, South-East District in which the explosion took place. The seam was 700 yards below the surface and was 4 feet 3 inches thick with an overlying dirt band or “flamper” eight inches thick. The No.2 unit was a longwall face 192 yards long. There were 72 yards on the left-hand side of the main loader and haulage gate and 120 yards on the right of that gate. In each bank there was a belt conveyor which delivered to a gate loader in the centre gate. The loader gate was in the main intake and on reaching the face the air split right and left. The right split returned down the right tailgate and the left split travelled partly by way of the left tailgate and partly by way of the No.9’s face and these two air currents joined in the No.2 return gate outbye of the No.9 left-hand airway. Two hurdle sheets were placed in the left tailgate and regulated the quantity of air passing down that gate and directed the air up into the ripping lip. No.9 conveyor face had not been worked for six weeks prior to the explosion. The width of the loader gate between the packs was 12 feet and the tailgates were 10 feet wide. A face ripping six feet thick was being carried in the former and the latter five feet thick.

The rate of advance of the face was about 25 feet per week, the depth of the undercut being five feet and the cutting on this face done by two machines. The sequence of operation was that the day shift filled coal, the afternoon shift cut and filled holings and the night shift ripped, packed, turned over and drew timber. Shots were fired in both coal and rippings and the average number of shots fired per day was 26 in the coal and 12 in the rippings. Coal shot were fired on the day shift and ripping shots at night. On the No.2 face 37 people were employed on the day shift and 32 on the night shift. There was a deputy on each shift and one shotfirer on the day shift.

The quantity of air passing through the district was recorded on the 8th. January as 11,600 cubic feet per minute and on the same day the measurement in the tailgate was 2,800 cubic feet per minute. No measurement was taken in the left tailgate or on the No.9 face. At the inquest the head surveyor said that these were the actual velocities and no allowance had been made for friction and when adjusted the readings would have been 11,890 and 3,310 respectively. Small amounts of firedamp had been reported from November 1936 to January 1937 and on the 11th. November, Thomas Barley, a stallman working at the top end of the face found a small percentage of firedamp in a pothole near the corner when he inspected at the beginning of his shift but it was cleared as stated in the deputies report. In the general body of the air on the face, no firedamp had ever been found.

On the day of the explosion, the day shift men were engaged in filling off the undercut coal and timbering up the face with steel props and bars. There were 11 colliers and three contractors on the left bank. The three contractors, one of whom was Frank Mansell were normally employed in the 9’s gate scouring a road through from the loader gate to the left tailgate but they had been sent to the left bank to deal with a “roll” which at the time was crossing the face. This roll partially cut the seam and restricted the height in the bank and they were engaged in enlarging the area.

Leslie Stevens, the regular day shift deputy had gone to the Central Rescue Station for his quarterly practice and Willis Fish, a shotfirer and spare deputy was in charge of the No.2 unit on the day of the accident. He arrived at the face about 7 a.m. and first examined the left bank and then the right bank. he tested for firedamp in many places and found none. At the time he noticed a break over the coal cutter, in the top corner but it was not giving off gas. At about 9.30 a.m. he attended to some matters in the loader gate and then went to the face by way of the 7’s main gate and the 2’s left tailgate. The two regulator cloths in this gate were seen to be in good order. From the tailgate he then went to the top corner and travelled the whole of the 9’s face, returning the same way to the 2’s face and along the left bank of that face to the loader gate. There was then no fall on 9’s face and no gas was found.

The right bank was inspected again later as was the right side of 6’s main gate and he then went up the loader gate to the face and spent some time with John Dowds the shotfirer. There were eight “Ringrose” automatic gas detectors of the face, tow in the left bank and six in the right bank. Tow of the latter had been taken in by men who had been moved from other faces. There were also a number of flame safety lamps used as detector lamps on the face and at least four of these were on the left bank. Having again examined the right and left banks he started an inspection from the loader gate about 1 p.m. This examination extended to the top corner and 20 yards down 9’s face and all was found to be normal with the ventilation taking its normal course but the break at the 2’s face was a little more pronounced.

The deputy estimated he left the top corner at about 1.35 p.m. and Edmund Smith was the only man working there setting supports. He had a “Ringrose” detector with him which was hung on a bar within five yards of the corner over the belt race. The coal in the top stints had been filled out, four men including two who lost their lives, were moved down near the roll to assist in filling off some of the remaining coal that was there. The deputy again went into the right bank and on his way he saw the let bank coal cutter men in the loading gate getting their trailing cable ready, after which he returned to the men near the roll and finally left them completing timbering preparatory to going home.

Fish again went down the right bank to see that everything was in good order at the end of the shift and was about 40 yards from the loader gate when he felt a rush of air and heat, an interruption of the ventilation followed by smoke and dust. He saw no flame and heard no report.

John Dowds, the shotfirer on the No.2 face had fired 22 shots between 6.45 and 11.30 a.m. on the day of the accident which included three shots in the roll on the left bank at about 9 a.m. In no case did he detect any firedamp before or after firing any of these shots. The nearest shot to the left tailgate was about 24 yards lower down the face and this was fired at 8 a.m. In the course of his shift, he had no reason to go into the top corner, nor the left tailgate. When the explosion occurred Dowds was in the right-hand bank about 25 yards below the loader gate. He felt a rush of wind down the face but was not injured in any way. In his evidence at the inquiry, Dowds dismissed any possibility of a shot causing the explosion.

During the morning Dowds had been visited by the shift overman Albert Edward Brown who started at the loader gate at about 10 o’clock and travelled up the left bank as far as the top corner testing for gas and found none. at the time the ventilation appeared to be satisfactory and he noticed a “Ringrose” detector hung up about eight feet from the top corner and a flame safety lamp between the corner and the tailgate. After spending some time on the rods the overman returned to the pit bottom which he reached about 1 p.m.

The last man to leave the top end of the left bank before the explosion was Herbert Smith, a stallman on the day shift. He worked in the third stint from the top almost opposite the left tailgate. He had a flame safety lamp as well as an electric lamp, and he had hung the flame lamp on a bar near to where he was working. By 1 p.m. he had filled out his stint and the deputy asked him to give Slater a hand to the men below him. He stayed with Slater until about 2.30 p.m. Meanwhile the cutter men F. Roddy and L. Cadywould arrived at about 1.45 p.m. and Smith helped them to get the trailing cable along the face up to the machine. About a quarter of an hour later when Smith was looking along the face towards the top end he saw a flash and heard a crack from the machine which appeared to come from the pommel end. Shortly afterwards Roddy came down the face and as he passed Smith he was asked what was going on. Roddy replied, “The machine has bust”. After being away some little time Roddy returned and Smith asked him what he was going to do to which Roddy replied, “Try it again”. A similar conversation took place between Walter Frost, who was on the face and Roddy.

Frank Mansell, the contractor who was working on the roll, has seen what had happened and he said that Roddy and Cadywould arrived at the face about 1.30 p.m. and the contractors helped them to get the cable along the face. Cadywould later came and asked the contractors to leave him a shovel when they left. This they forgot to do but as they were dressing in the 9’s scouring just after 2.30 p.m. Cadywould came for the shovel and before he left said, “We have had a blue flame flash out of the side of the cutter.” and Mansell told him to leave the cutter until someone had attended to it. W. Hardwick, a fitter, also heard the remark and told him to get an electrician to the machine. There was in fact an electrician at the sub-station about 300 yards away. Cadywould made no reply and left with the shovel.

Herbert Smith finished his work at the tailgate where he had left his clothes, dressed and proceeded outbye by hat gate. he arrived at the pit bottom without knowing of the explosion which occurred about 10 minutes after he had left the face. when he passed through the sheets at the tailgate they were in order and he said he left them undisturbed.

While he was working his stint, Smith had noticed a “Ringrose” hanging over the belt race towards the top corner and this did not come into action during the shift. The detector was in the charge of Edmund Smith who worked at the to of the stint but according to Herbert Smith Edmund wen down the bank to give someone else a hand at about 2.15 p.m. he took his clothes but whether he took the “Ringrose” Herbert was unable to say.

The coal cuttermen descended about 1 p.m. and were seen at the pit bottom by Brown the overman who learned that of the three-man team one, A. Pitchford had not turned up and in consequence they had no “Ringrose” with them. Brown told Roddy to use the “Ringrose” already o the face in the charge of E. Smith until a third man Charles Moreton would be sent to them with a detector. No flame safety lamp was taken by the cutter men. Moreton went inbye with Sydney Smith the grummer for the right bank cutter and they travelled together up No.6’s main gate and into 2’s right had tailgate and undressed about 200 yards from the face. Moreton then had a “Ringrose” as he left Smith and went to the face carrying it. For some reason the detector never arrived at the left bank and was taken out after the explosion by Walter Bray who found it hung on a bar at the face almost opposite the right tailgate. Moreton was found dead near the machine along with the two cutter men and he could not have been in the vicinity of the machine for more than a few minutes when the disaster occurred.

Walter Frost who had been working just above the roll in the left bank had finished work, and at about 2.40 p.m. was putting clothes on alongside the conveyor about 17 yards above the loader gate when there was a “crack like a shot out of a gun” accompanied by “a blue flame surging around my neck, my face and my legs” then a cloud of smoke and he was knocked over. he was severely burned but managed to crawl down the face to the gate end, then over the loader end and down the main gate as best he could where he was found by men from the right bank who helped him outbye. He received attention and then was taken to hospital on a stretcher. Frost said the flame appeared to come down the face from the top end where the coal cutter was.

Fred Bassett had also finished work and was in the loader gate when there was a bang and a rush of hot air which burned the left side of his neck and arm. The rush came from the left bank. Of those who survived the explosion these two men were the nearest to the scene of the disaster and they were both able to give evidence at the inquest.

The deputy, Willis Fish was on the right bank about 35 to 40 yards below the loader gate when he felt the rush of air come from the left side followed by dust and heat. a number of men were working in the right bank and he took them out at once along the right tailgate and up the No.6’s main gate on the main plane. Afterwards he went to the loader gate and onto the face again where he joined the shotfirer John Dowds. On the Main Plane he met R. Warner, an afternoon deputy from an adjoining district who told him he had already telephoned to notify the manager.

The shot firer was about 25 yards down the right bank at the time of the explosion and accompanied by others went down the loading gate where he saw an oil lamp still burning and then gave first aid to Frost and Bassett. Just beyond the roll Baggaley was found alive partly buried under a fall and was removed and sent out on a stretcher. Close to him was the body of Furniss. After setting some temporary supports in place of those which had been blown out and turning on the compressed air to help with the ventilation, another body as found a little further up the bank. By this time the Rescue Brigade had arrived at the face. In the bank near the dead men, the shotfirer noticed two extinguished flame safety lamps.

The overman Brown, had left the pit but as he arrived home he was informed of the disaster by telephone and immediately went to the pit and proceeded below ground. He met Mr. Limb, the manager on the main plane near No.7’s main gate. The two men went along the main gate and 26 left tailgate to within six yards of the 7’s right-hand airway where they met afterdamp and had to go back. They then went up the loader gate where they found two stretcher cases being treated and then went up the left bank to join Dowds, Warner and others just before the Rescue Brigade arrived.

The Chesterfield Rescue Station received the call at 3.21 p.m. which they immediately answered and arrived at the coal face in No.2’s loader gate at 4.30 p.m. They went up the left bank and found two more bodies about ten yards beyond the others. This team got as far as the tailgate but as nearly all the timber had been knocked out and the roof showed signs of breaking they deemed it wise to withdraw for a consultation at the loader gate. At this point they were joined by the Manager of the Rescue stations, Mr. G.L. Brown and the Mansfield Station Brigade who had arrived at the colliery shortly after the Chesterfield Brigade.

Three cutter men were still missing and as they were believed to be near the machine at the top corner, it was decided to approach the face by the left tailgate. At No.7’s right had airway carbon monoxide and firedamp was encountered and between 9’s left had airway and 9’s top slit, a prop with some brattice attached to it was found to be on fire and extinguished. The Mansfield team was set to travel to the top corner of 2’s left bank by 9’s face but they were unable to do so because of a large fall. Air was passing over the fall but the men were unable to get through wearing their breathing apparatus. Mr. Brown and the Superintendent then travelled the tailgate alone right to the face, and in going up into the top corner they found the bodies of the remaining three men lying close together close to the face at the back end of the cutter. There were three electric lamps near them but there was not a “Ringrose” detector nearby. The detector that was taken in by E. Smith, whose body was found ten yards above the roll, was found lying close to the opposite face but slightly on the low side of the tailgate.

Mr. J. Hall, Senior Inspector of Mines went to the colliery when he was told of the disaster and went below ground to the fresh air base in the No.2’s airway at 6.10 p.m. where he met Mr. John Hunter, the General Manager and together they went up the tailgate to the face. They arrived just as the bodies of the three cuttermen had been removed. A sample of the air was taken eight feet from the machine and showed one per cent firedamp but the top corner was foul and over the machine there was an explosive mixture. A good current of air was organised to clear this.

Mr. Felton arrived at the colliery and found Mr. F.H. Wynne, H.M. Deputy Chief Inspector already at the colliery. These men and others made an inspection of the explosion area and found that firedamp was still present over the cutter and it was coming from a break in the roof. The mine was inspected again on the 23rd, January and the coal cutter examined by Mr. Cowan on the night of the explosion and removed to the surface for a detailed examination.

Those who lost their lives were:

  • Ralph Marsden aged 41 years a stallman,
  • Edward Baggaley aged 34 years a stallman,
  • Charles Moreton aged 29 years a cutterman,
  • Frank Roddy aged 25 years a cutterman,
  • Leonard Cadywould aged 21 years a cutterman,
  • Joseph Furniss aged 28 years a stallman,
  • William Caulwell aged 48 years a stallman,
  • Edmund Smith aged 29 years a stallman and
  • Wilfred E. Slater aged 30 years a stallman.

All the victims were burned and some had injuries but the cause of death of all of them was carbon monoxide poisoning.

The inquest into the deaths of the nine men was held at the County Police Court, Chesterfield before H.M. Coroner Dr. R.A. McRea and a jury on the 18th and 19th February 1937. The jury brought in the following verdict:

The deaths were accident caused by an unforeseen combination of abnormal conditions, that is, an accumulation of gas which was exploded by a flame which escaped from a cutting machine box caused by a faulty replacement of the cover plate. The jury is satisfied that every precaution and provision has been and is taken by the Staveley Coal and Iron Co. Ltd. to ensure the safety of the men working in their mines.

The inquiry into the causes of and the circumstances attending the explosion was carried out at the same time and the report presented to Captain Harry Crookshank, M.P., Secretary for Mines.

The evidence fixed the point of the explosion in the left bank and it travelled towards the loader gate with the flame extending as far as the roll across the face. Evidence of the violence of the blast in the bank was shown by the displaced roof supports, articles of clothing and lamps. In the left tailgate the hurdle sheets were blown down at the ripping, some bars were displaced and props set on fire. It was purely an explosion of firedamp and coal dust played no part in it.

As to the source of ignition, all the lamps that were recovered were examined and found in the main to be serviceable. Attention was focused on the coal cutter and it was found that there was a small gap in the controller compartment and some coal dust was trapped in there and it was thought that a spark ignited the firedamp.

There had been a fall and in the opinion of the inquiry the break in the top corner and evidence of weighting in the roof was accompanied by an emission of gas which in all probability developed in the time between the deputy’s last visit and the explosion. With an emission of gas in a colliery where there had been very little gas for a very long time and the faulty electrical system on the coal cutter, these were the ingredients that were the cause of the explosion.

 

REFERENCES
The report on the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Markham Colliery Derbyshire on 12th January 1937 by. J.R. Felton, O.B.E. H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines.
Colliery Guardian, 22nd Januray 1937, p.167, 4th June, p.1053, 29th October, p.809.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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