LOUISA. Stanley, Durham. 22nd. August, 1947.

The Louisa Colliery, including Morrison Old was formerly in the South Moor group of collieries belonging to Holmside and South Moor Collieries Limited and had been transferred to the “C” Group of No.6 Area of the Northern Division of the National Coal Board at the time of nationalisation. It was at South Moor, near Stanley in North West Durham and worked the middle series of the Durham seams, the Maudlin, Low Main and Hutton in an area bounded on the west by the outcrop of these seams in the Lanchester district. The upper seams in the same royalty, the Shield Row, Five Quarter and Main Coal were worked from Hedley Colliery and both mines had a common shaft which was an upcast, called the Charley Fan Shaft where an electrically driven Sirocco fan produced 175,000 cubic feet of air per minute at two and a half inches water gauge. The lower seams in the district were the Townley, Busty and Brockwell which were worked from Morrison Old Colliery which was a separate mine with its own upcast and downcast shafts.

The Louisa Colliery was served by three shafts, the Louisa, the William and The Morrison North. The colliery employed 1,480 people underground and 350 on the surface with an average daily output of 1,450 tons. All the output was wound at the Louisa shaft except a small amount of overflow coal at the Morrison North shaft.

Many changes in the main officials had been brought about following public ownership of the mines on the 1st. January and on the 22nd. August, the day of the explosion, Mr William Welsh was the No.6 Area General Manager, Mr. G.H. Braithwaite, Agent, “C” Group, Mr. J.F. Meek, the manager of the Louisa Colliery with Mr. R. Peel, undermanager of Louisa and William Sections of the Louisa Colliery and Mr. R. Simpson the undermanager of the Morrison North Section of the Louisa Colliery. A third undermanager, Mr. E.W. Marshall who was normally in charge of the William Section and had been temporally withdrawn to act as the manager of another mine in the group. He had acted as manager during July 1947 before which Mr. J. E. Bragan had managed the mine for four years and Mr Meek had been left in charge from 1st. August only.

Mr. William Welsh was formerly the chief mining engineer for the South Moor group. He was trained at the colliery and had been the manager of the Louisa Colliery for some years and he had an intimate and detailed knowledge of the underground workings and conditions. Mr. Braithwaite was appointed Agent on 1st. March and Messrs. Marshall, Peel and Simpson had been employed in the South Moor group for some years.

Each section of the colliery had its own complement of overmen covering the period from 3 a.m. to 11.30 p.m. daily and the uncovered period if the night shift was under the sole charge of a master-shifter who worked from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. On the Friday night in question, the fore-shift overman of the Louisa section, John Hutchinson started his Saturday shift in accordance with the established routine. He also took an important part in the rescue operations which will be described later.

In the Low Main and Hutton seams, open lights were used until 1941 apart from certain districts inbye where safety lamps were used. In 1941, following a suggestion by the Divisional Inspector who had draw attention to the fact that workmen were hiding matches and other contraband on the main intake haulage road which serves one of the safety lamp sections. He pointed out that a serious fire in the Low Main Seam in 1929 had been caused by an acetylene lamp and the Chief Mining Engineer, William Walsh, decided to install safety lamps throughout the Louisa Old and William sections excluding the Morrison North section of shallow work under wet conditions approaching the outcrop. The full implications of safety lamps were accepted in these two areas in respect to searching persons and the application of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order, and the use of certified flameproof electrical apparatus and firedamp detectors. The 4th. North Morrison District, which was within half a mile of the Morrison North shaft and over one and a half miles from the Louisa shaft was formerly an open light area of Morrison North but in order to meet the workmen’s claim that this district should be included in the Louisa Workmen’s Lodge, it was placed under the jurisdiction of the Louisa undermanager and worked with safety lamps.

The Hutton Seam at the colliery was on average, two and a half feet thick with a strong shale roof and a seggar floor and gave a high quality gas coal. It had been worked extensively and there was little to extract. The 4th North District was a small area of the seam that had been affected by the fire of 1929 in the Low Main seam which was 30 feet above. It had been necessary to seal off a pillared area of about 100 acres in this upper seam. During 1944 the fire was encountered and new seals erected near the focus of the old fire. This made the working of the Hutton seam available and the lower seams under the area to be worked from the Morrison Busty Colliery. There was no record of inflammable gas being found in the seam prior to the explosion.

In the Fourth North District, the depth the seam was about 450 feet and it dipped slightly 1 in 29 to the south-east. The small piece of solid coal that was to be worked was bounded on all four sides either by goaf of bord and pillar workings. The area was then entered by its north end by means of a 1 in 6 stone drift driven due east from the 4th. North Low Main Haulage Road and continued in the seam skirting the whole of the workings n the north side. From the east heading, another heading was driven south through the heart of the area and longwall faces were won to the east and west.

By August 1947, four conveyor faces had been worked to the west to a barrier line fixed to protect the 4th. North Low Main Haulage Road. Two conveyor faces and been worked up to and connected with the Old Wembley gateway face and two other faces, the Straight East and the 2nd East were being worked to the east. The Straight East face was the first conveyor face to be started in the district but it had to be stopped in September 1946 because of very wet conditions. It was not restated until July 1947 by which time it had become dry. To the south of the 2nd East face, there were two tub gateway faces working narrow strips of coal between the 2nd East face and the barrier being left to support the Low Main Cross-cut Haulage Road to the Louisa shaft.

All the coal in the district was hewed with air picks and shots had never been fired in the coal. Top rippings were got down by shots in all the roadways and the roof on the conveyor or faces caved regularly between the gateside packs. All the conveyor machinery and a small haulier on the South Heading were electrically driven, but one small pump in the East Motor bord old right face was driven by compressed air. The two face conveyors were of the chain type. The Straight East conveyor delivered to a chain conveyor in the gate and the 2nd. East conveyor to a belt chain conveyor delivered to tubs on the South Heading. The tubs were hauled from both loading points by rope haulage. Chain conveyors had also been employed in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 old West bords.

The ventilation of the district was supplied from a split from the 4th. North Low Main Haulage Road leading from Morrison North shaft and since it was close to the upcast shaft, the quantity of air passing was heavily regulated. At the Wembley connection, there was a fixed cloth across a wooden door which had been damaged by the roof weighting and on the North Heading return airway off the Straight East gate there was the usual type of wooded regulator door. The quantity of air recorded on 18th. August which entered the district was 9,040 cubic feet per minute. The air was coursed by means of canvas cloths into the South Heading up to No.2 West bord and the around the district. Roughly half the quantity was allowed to pass into the return as the Wembley connection and the remainder which was measured at 4,135 cubic feet, ventilated the Straight East face and gate on its way out to the North Heading return airway. No measurement had been taken at or near a point in the airway 10 yards on the intake side of the first working place as was required by the No.6 (c) Coal Mines (Ventilation) General Regulations, 1947 but the quantity entering this return airway was recorded as 4,820 cubic feet on 18th August which indicated little leakage through the heavy canvas cloth across the short length of the Straight East gate between the district main intake and the return airway and the inquiry thought that the ventilation of the district under normal conditions was adequate.

The district was worked in a succession of shifts which commenced at 3 a.m. on Monday and ended at 6.30 a.m. on Saturday in each week. Four shifts of men and three shifts of deputies, one on each shift in rotation covered this period. The fore shift, 3 a.m. to 10.30 a.m. with the fore shift deputies working 2 a.m. to 10.30 a.m., the back shift 9.30 a.m. to 5 p.m. and the deputies 10 a.m. to. 6 30 p.m., the third shift 4 p.m. to 11.30 p.m. and the night shift 10 p.m. to 5. 30. a.m. and 11 p.m. to 6.30 a.m. with the night shift deputies 6 p.m. to 2.30 a.m. The arrangement for work in the district was rather complicated. Coal was produced on all shifts except the night shift. In the Straight East face, 40 yards long, six hewers completed a daily advance at the face of about 4 and a half feet in one shift, which changed on a weekly rotation. On the 2nd East face, 60 yards long, hewers were employed on the other two of the three coaling shifts. Conveyor movers and the conveyor gate caunchmen came in on the shift immediately following the coal loading shifts, which meant they were worked and of the four shifts in different weeks. On the night shift the gateway caunchmen, back caunchmen and the gate conveyor extended and men cleaning up spillage and stone dusting were employed while two stone drillers were usually employed between 7 p.m. and 12 midnight. Since the introduction of the 5-day week, some of the men normally employed on the Friday for or back shifts were able to be brought in at 11 p.m. the same night.

On Monday of each week, the for-shift deputy made a pre-shift inspection after which work was continuous for the week and each of the three deputies made two during-shift inspections and entered a report on each during his shift. The overlap of the three shifts was sufficient to enable them to relieve each other at the meeting station in the district. On Friday evening of each week, the deputies came on shift earlier and on the day of the explosion, Friday 22nd, August, the back shift deputy was J.W. Maughan form 10 a.m. to 6. 30 p.m. and the night shift deputy was T. Hebden from 4 p.m. to 11.30 p.m. This deputy, however, reached the surface of the Morrison North shaft at 11.20 p.m. where he met the fore shift deputy John Estell, who should have descended at 11.20 p.m. Before he left the district Hebden arranged provisionally with a deputy in charge of another district to tale charge if Estell eventually failed to turn up.

All the third shift had left at about the same time as Hebden and the persons on the shift in the district about 11.55 p.m. when the explosion occurred were, two stone drillers, Johnson and Kilgallon, who had descended the Louisa shaft and were admitted to the district by Hebden at 7 p.m. The men who had descended the Morrison North shaft at 10 p.m. and were admitted to the district by Hebden at 10.20 p.m. were, three conveyor movers, Bell, Chapman and Fenwick who had gone to advance the 2nd East face conveyor, two stonemen, Appleby and Rowland who were going to take out a low girder on the South Heading outbye of the 2nd East loading point and two other stonemen, Simpson and Brown who were going to continue a caunch along the West face line towards the inbye tailgate.

The men who descended at 11 p.m. and had reached their working places after Hebden had left, probably before Estell had arrived at the kist were two stonemen, Bailey and Talbot who were going to renew the “Warwick” girder near the outbye end of the Straight Loader gate. Two stonemen, Monto and Wesgarth were to complete the re-aligning of the Straight East gate conveyor and to clean up. Three datal hands, Reed, Moore and Bell were to clean up on 2nd East Loading gate, three datal hands McKever, Roe and Martin, to repair the rail track on the South Heading outbye and the 2nd East loading point and four stonemen, Hodgson, Grimley and Rutherford and Birtle who were going to the caunch in the 2nd East loading gate and the 2nd East tailgate, and the inbye tub gateways. The deputy Estell, reached the kist at the meeting station within a few minutes of the occurrence.

Four of the fourteen men who came on shift at 11 p.m. had already worked on the fore shift, and four others on the back shift of the same day. There were thus eight additional persons to the normal night shift on shift at that time. Each of these men carried an Edison “J” electric cap lamp but none carried a flame lamp gas detector as was required by the rules of the colliery. Hebden stated that the reported the fact to Estell at the surface but apparently, Estell took no action in the matter and his flame lamp was the only gas detector in the district at the time of the disaster.

On the fore shift on 22nd, August the for overman, John Hutchinson, had inspected the whole of the district including the West face line and had found the ventilation very satisfactory and free from firedamp. Maughan found no firedamp during the back shift nor did Hebden on the third shift and the overman, T. Amos, tested at the ripping face lip at the Straight East gate and found them clear as late as 10 p.m. two hours before the explains, Two drillers had left the East faces about 15 minutes before and they stated that conditions were normal at that time.

The explosion occurred at 11.55 p.m. during the first and second hours of the fourth or night shift on Friday 22nd, August 1947. All twenty-four men who were working in the district were involved, nineteen were found dead, and of the five that were recovered alive two subsequently died. None of the other 192 that were in the mine was affected.

The first persons to raise the alarm and to reach the scene of the disaster were a party of three deputies, W. Younger, J. Shanley and Henry Robinson, all of whom were trained rescue men and who were regularly employed in the area nearby where there had been a fire. The party usually carried a canary and flame detectors lamps and they had with them a reviving apparatus for use in an emergency. They had examined the fire stoppings alongside the 4th. North Low Main Road on their way inbye from Morrison North shaft and had just reached their station in the fire area which was about 250 yards to the south and beyond the off takes of the 4th. North District when they felt a momentary cessation of the intake air followed immediately by a rush of dust-laden air coming from the direction of the Morrison North shaft. This occurred at 11.15 p.m. according to Young’s watch.

They fully realised what this meant and they picked up the canary and their flame lamps and ran to the north to the Morrison North shaft which was the seat of the trouble, as they thought. They soon found that the problem was in the 4th North District. Shanley then returned to the 4th. Bankhead and telephoned the surface while Younger and Robinson entered the 4th North District taking the canary with them. They went to the Straight East gate, through the heavy canvas cloth which they found intact when they saw a light and heard moaning sounds ahead. Thirty yards further up they found Minto alive but unconscious and Bailey and Talbot apparently dead.

Robinson went back to the 4th North offtakes to telephone for urgent help and to get a stretcher for Minto with whom Younger and stayed with him. It was then 12.20 a.m. according to Younger who then discovered Bailey alive so he went to meet Robinson who was returning with a stretcher and sent him to get reviving apparatus from the fire area. Robinson soon returned with Shanley and the fore-overman John Hutchinson, who had gone down the Morrison North shaft at midnight and had been informed of Shanley’s telephone message. Younger and Shanley then recovered the three men in the Straight East gate while Hutchinson and Robinson attempted to explore the South Heading, but the air this time, was too hot and thick with fumes to enable them to go very far. Later on, and without effecting any repairs to canvas cloths, these four men were alive to get along the Heading as far as the 2nd. East loading point and up to the East loading gate as far as the face line. The cloths across the Old East gate had been disarranged and the one across the 2nd. East gate had been destroyed. They came across the two drillers, Johnson and Kilgallon who were alive but unconscious at the deputies kist and they brought them back into the fresh air.

By the time the first rescue tea, had arrived in the district, at about 1.30 a.m. These men had also recovered deputy Estell still alive at the kist and had brought out five dead bodies from the South Heading and they had located four bodies in the 2nd East loading gate. An attempt was also made to get to the loading pint on the Straight East gate, where they could see signs of fire, but the fumes were too heavy for the, to make any progress. They were not, at that time, aware that were any men on the West side but the canvas screen across the South heading to divert the current into the No.1 West bord had been destroyed and this side was consequently fouled by afterdamp.

About this time the undermanager, Mr. Peel, arrived at the scene and took charge of the operations. The rescue teams quickly located the remaining bodies on the South heading beyond the 2nd East loading point and on the 2nd East gate beyond the face line and on the West side. Other rescue teams entered the Straight East gate where they found Westgarth with his clothing on fire. Other clothing that was there and a wood chock carrying the gearhead, was smouldering. They put out the fires with sand and brought the body out. The fumes in the gate quickly disappeared. They found no falls that were seriously impeding the ventilation which was quickly restored by re-erecting the cloths across the South Heading and the 2nd East loading gate and renewing those in the old East gates. The remaining bodies were recovered without the use of rescue apparatus.

Those killed:

  • Harold Talbot aged 34 years, stoneman.
  • Alfred Bailey aged 49 years, stoneman.
  • Edmund Westgate aged 39 years, stoneman.
  • John Estell aged 38 years, deputy.
  • Thomas McKever aged 46 years, datal hand.
  • Walter Roe aged 18 years, datal hand.
  • Francis Eric Martin aged 21 years, datal hand.
  • Thomas W. Appleby aged 45 years, stoneman.
  • John Rowland aged 54 years, stoneman.
  • Gerald Moore aged 21 years, datal hand.
  • William Reed aged 37 years, datal hand.
  • Thomas Bell (1). aged 28 years, datal hand.
  • Joseph S. Hodgson aged 28 years, stoneman.
  • Thomas Bell aged 49 years, conveyor mover.
  • Norman Fenwick aged 32 years, conveyor mover.
  • Joseph Chapman aged 37 years, conveyor mover.
  • Colin Simpson aged 39 years, stoneman.
  • Reginald L. Brown aged 32 years, stoneman.
  • John Grimley aged 41 years, stoneman.
  • William Rutherford aged 32 years, stoneman.
  • Robert Birtle aged 27 years, stoneman.

The injured:

  • Clement Minto aged 42 years, stoneman,
  • William H. Johnson aged 40 years, driller and
  • James Killgallon aged 40 years, driller.

Gerry Moore and Eric Martin were two Bevin Boys, conscripted by arbitrary lot to work in the mines between 1943 and 1945 to help the mines continue working through the dark days of the Second World War and immediately afterwards. They were the only two Bevin Boys that lost their lives while working in the pits though many others were injured in the collieries throughout the country.

The inquiry into the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Louisa (including Morrison Old) Colliery, Durham on 22nd August 1947, was conducted by R. Yates, D.S.O., M.C., H.M. Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines and presented to The Right Honourable Hugh Gaitskell, C.B.E., M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power on 21st February 1948.

The exploration of the district was possible within a few hours of the disaster at which time the undermanager found a small quantity of firedamp in a roof cavity at a 3-foot fault at the roadhead of No.4 West Bord, about a foot from the roof but which was not detectable in the general body of the air. This had dispersed the following day. It became evident that coal dust had played a major part in the explosion and in view of the amount of coking and the previous history of the seam at the colliery it was first thought that it had been an explosion solely of coal dust and that firedamp had not entered into it at all. The investigation showed that there was no evidence of any pre-formed cloud of coal dust had been created at the onset or that there had been any igniting medium of sufficient intensity to initiate a coal dust explosion. The explosion generated very little violence. The Inspector said:

It is, I think, reasonable to deduce from this evidence that a mild firedamp explosion in which coal dust played no part at first had traversed the east face line between the Straight East loading gate and the 2nd. East loading gate and had extended outbye along the gates and the intermediate East Motor bord, so as to open up several separate coal dust explosions, one in each of the gates.

As to the presence of firedamp, Mr. Yates commented:

In the absence of any other feasible explanation for the source and prescience of this inflammable mixture on the East side, that the firedamp came from the lower workings and that the locus of the emission was on that part of the East face line immediately on the return side of the Wembley connection where the area would be above the most intensive abutment pressure zone in the Towneley Seam. The evidence of increased violence at this place indicates a richer inflammable mixture there.

After the explosion there was a thorough search for contraband was made by two Inspectors of Mines, accompanied by the Manager and Undermanager and representatives of the workmen. Cigarettes, matches and one pocket lighter were found, some in the pockets and clothing belonging to the victims. There was also some in tins hidden near the working places, 26 spent matches and three cigarette ends were found beneath and behind the deputies kist and other contraband was found lying exposed on the floor or near the delivery end of the Straight East gate conveyor. The condition of the contraband did not indicate that there had been smoking on the night of the explosion. Those found at the end of the Straight East gate was significant. The contraband consisted of two whole but badly damaged cigarettes in an open and damaged cigarette case and a spent match. All were lying close together in the full tub track near the loading point. A short distance away there was a whole cigarette which had not been lighted but had one end slightly damaged as if it had been placed in the mouth ready for lighting. This seemed to indicate that a match was struck at this point just before the explosion. The inspector came to the following conclusion:

That during the night shift if Friday 22nd August 1947, there was an emission of firedamp from the strata below the Hutton Seam which created an inflammable mixture of firedamp and air on the East face line and the Straight East gate that shortly before midnight a lucifer match struck about the loading point on the Straight East gate for the purpose of lighting a cigarette ignited this mixture and initiated a very mild firedamp explosion, which developed additional force as it progressed and which was propagated by coal dust along the mechanised roadways, both exiting and disused, throughout the district and that the explosion was finally extinguished by stone dust on the South Heading and the Main Drift.

The inquiry made the final observations and recommendations following the explosion:

1). The disquieting feature of this exploit was the ready propagation of the flame by the coal dust along the roadways on which conveyors had either been used or were in use, and there seems little doubt from the evidence left by the explosion that after having been initiated by firedamp it received its main “kick-off” by coal dust explosion about the loading point on the 2nd East gate.

2). The danger of coal dust on disused roadways was demonstrated by this explosion and I would stress the necessity for adequate treatment of such roads so long as they remain accessible, as required by the Coal Dust Regulations, and that when these roads become untravellable they should either be sealed off or otherwise protected by a substantial barrage of stone dust at each end.

3).In view of the increased hazard of coal dust brought about by mechanised mining, I further recommend that on respect of No.10 of the Coal Dust Regulations the Modification order of 1939 made under the Defence Regulations, 1939 be revoked to allow the minimum percentage of incombustible matter laid down by the Schedule to Regulation 3 to have full application in the cases of coals having a volatile matter content exceeding 27 per cent.

4). The igniting cause of the explosion can, in the last analysis, be attributed to “mixed light”, conditions and I recommend that unless the different sections of workmen are completely segregated from the surface inbye the use of open lights should be prohibited in any mine where safety lamps have been introduced into any part (other than as a temporary precaution)

5). The potential danger of an emission of firedamp from the intervening strata due to concurrent working of the lower seam or seams needs to be emphasised and a careful watch should be kept for such a contingency, especially in that part of the workings overlying the abutment area of coal ribs in the lower working, to enable suitable precautions to be taken in time.

6). I consider it expedient that the searching of persons for contraband should be made compulsory in all mines or parts of mines in which safety lamps are used, whether or not they are required by the Coal Mines Act, 1911.

7). Lastly, the question of inculcating a safety lamp outlook amongst the miners of the North West and Mid Durham, in particular, remains to be tackled. Many of these men have at some time or other worked under open light conditions, and following a change of mine or the latter adoption of safety lamps at mines previously on open lights, they find it difficult to give up old and ingrained habits of smoking while at work hence their apparent indifference to, and disregard of, the rules prohibiting the taking of contraband underground.

It is a sad reflection on Durham that four explosions of firedamp, each involving loss of life, which have occurred in the county during the past eighteen months have been due to contraband and in the case of the fifth explosion in 1944 probably due to the sparking of coal face switchgear, contraband was found on the body of the victim.

I am well aware that this question of contraband had exercised the minds of the representatives of the workmen for some time, but I suggest they should intensify their efforts to overcome the apathy of many of their members to the menace to the safety of Durham mines.

The inspector concluded his report thus:

It is fitting to conclude this Report with a reference to the excellent work done by the three deputies, Younger, Shanley and Robinson and Overman Hutchinson immediately after the explosion. These men were called upon to take what, in the circumstances, might be described as a judicious risk of further explosion, and they acted with commendable promptitude and courage and displayed great resourcefulness and circumspection. At no time were they tempted to do anything foolhardy, and it is to their great credit that not only did they discover and bring out to fresh air five badly injured men and ensure prompt first-aid attention to them but they also satisfied themselves at an early stage that there were no persons remaining alive in the district. High tributes to their conduct were paid at the Inquest by the Coroner and all the representatives of the various parties. The National Coal Board had formally recommended that recognition be given to these men for their work and a case is now being prepared by the Divisional Inspector for your consideration.

 

REFERENCES
The report on the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Louisa (including Morrison Old) Colliery, Durham on the 22nd August 1947 by R. Yates, D.S.O., M.C., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines.
The Bevin Boys Story. Phil Yates.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

Return to previous page