FERNDALE. Tylorstown Pit. Rhondda Fach, Glamorganshire. 27th. January, 1896.

The colliery was the property of Messrs. D. Davis and Sons Limited, Ferndale and had been bought from Messrs. A. Tylor and Company, Limited in January 1894. They were in the Rhondda Fach about 17 miles North West of Cardiff. The Company owned the Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 pits all of which were more or less connected and worked the semi-bituminous South Wales steam coal. The explosion affected three of these pits, Nos.6, 7, and 8 which were taken over by this Company two years before. Nos.6 and 7 formed a pair of pits within 26 yards of each other and No.8 Pit which was also known as Cynllwyndu Pit was 937 yards further down the valley which had been sunk by A. Tylor and Company about three years before. No.6 Pit was 16 feet in diameter and sunk only to the Four Feet seam at a depth of about 450 yards. No.7 Pit was also 16 feet in diameter and sunk to the Four Feet seam at 330 yards. The No.8 Pit was eighteen and a half feet in diameter and was sunk to the Five Feet Seam at about 600 yards passing through the Four Feet at 416 yards and the Six Feet at about 400 yards. Coal was raised from all three pits; at No.6 from the Five Feet at No.7 from the Four Feet and Six Feet and at the No.8 from the Six Feet. The only connection between Nos.6 and 7 Pits and No. 8 Pit was in the Six Feet workings.

The No.6 Pit was the upcast for all the three pits and the ventilation was produced by a Schiele fan, 21 feet in diameter, placed 29 yards from the mouth of the No.6 Pit Nos.7 and 8 were both downcast shafts. The fan delivered a total of 202,771 cubic feet of air per minute through the three pits. The Four Feet and the Six Feet seams were those that had been extensively worked and for the most part, the working in the former was under those of the latter with the exception of places where the Six Feet had been worked from No.8 Pit and some adjoining workings in the same seam from No.7 Pit. The Six Feet seam in the workings were, therefore, in maiden coal and had not been drained of gas by the upper seam being worked. The Five Feet seam was commenced in January 1895 when the No.6 Pit was sunk to it from the Four Feet seam in 1893 and the workings, at the time of the accident, were small. They were connected to the No.5 Ferndale Pit at one point but had a separate ventilation system.

All the seams produced firedamp freely and were lit exclusively with locked safety lamps. These were bonneted Clanny types which were the property of the workmen who took them home and cleaned them. There was no lamp room at the colliery. Each overman of a district acted as a competent person under the 10th General Rule and locked the lamps at a “lamp station” before they were taken into a district. In Nos.7 and 8 Pits there were five such lamps stations, all of which were in the intake airways which satisfied the requirements of the 11th General Rule. The lamp station for the No.6 Pit was at the surface.

Blasting was not permitted for coal getting in any of the seams but it was allowed for ripping the roof of the roadways and in making the headings in the working of the Six feet seam in both Nos.7 and 8 Pits. The use of gunpowder was discontinued by the management in November 1894 and at that time they used Roberite, Bellite or Ammonite. When these newer explosives were introduced, the mode of firing shots was changed from a fuse to that of an electric battery, but for some reason, the fuse had been reintroduced just weeks before the explosion. The fireman acted as “shotmen” under the Special Rules and they ignited the charge by means of a wire which they heated by passing through the gauze of their safety lamps which were Davy lamps with an additional bonnet above and a movable glass below. Shotfiring was restricted to the interval between a day shift and a night shift or in the morning between a night shift and a day shift.

Colliers and rippers bored all the holes for the shots and charged the with explosive which they obtained from magazines which belonged to the owners. The shift colliers usually got heir explosives on leaving work and took them home to be ready for the following morning. Those working on the night shift obtained in the morning and took it home with them ready for the evening shift. By this method, colliers and others requiring explosives had facilities to take explosives that the management did not permit into the mine. It was not difficult for the men to get gunpowder and various forms of dynamite in a large mining village. At the inquiry, it was stated that the firemen had instructions to see the holes charged but further evidence showed that this happened only occasionally.

The seams were worked on the longwall system with the face advancing and the roadways for ventilation and transporting the coal were made through the “gob” or waste behind the face. Stone was obtained from ripping the roof and for the continual enlargement of the roadways and maintaining the mine good order and height. Small coal debris from falls and road cleanings were “gobbed” or stowed between as the faces advanced.

The coal was hauled by mechanical power and there were three large engines worked by steam which was brought down the pit from the surface, near the bottom of the No.7 Pit and another near the bottom of a dip drift to the Six Feet seam, within 200 yards of the bottom of the No.7 Pit. In No.6 Pit there was a steam engine that was powered by steam also from the surface and in No.8 Pit there were four engines worked by compressed air sent from the surface. Except for four headings in the rise workings of No.8 Pit, where the gradient was 1 1n 4, and where hand crabs were used, all the rest of the haulage was done by horses of which there were 183 in the three pits. Eighty two of them were killed in the explosion.

The workings on the east side of No.7 Pit in the Four Feet Seam extended eastwards for 1,350 yards and 2,070 yards to the south-east and 1,060 yards to the northeast. To the west of the pit, they extended south-west in a straight line for 1,580 yards and from there a further 400 yards north. At a point 540 yards in from the shaft on the main west level there was a branch extending 957 yards to the North West. These workings were divided into districts, the Pendyris, the Penrheol and the Darwonne on the east and the Dip, the Penrhys, No.6 and No.9 on the west. At a point, 20 yards to the west of the No.7 Pit bottom, a drift which dipped at 1 in six reached the Six Feet seam at 157 yards and from this point, the workings in the Six Feet went northeast for 620 yards to the face of a district which was not being worked and a small district called “Swamp”. To the west of this drift the main level went on for 1,560 yards but the working at the end was not in operation. At 528 yards along the level, there was a branch to the rise into the “Hard Heading District” and the No.21 district on the west was reached. It was 1,166 yards to the face, and this was the only working district to the rise on the west side of the shaft.

Returning to the dip drift at 100 yards west on the main level was the entrance to “Blacker’s dip” which the lower workings in the Swamp district to the east and the No.1 district on the west were reached. Blacker’s dip was also the main communication between the workings of No.7 and No.8 pit in the Six Feet seam. in the No.8 Pit the workings extended 560 yards to the east, 550 yards to the south and 418 yards to the north where they joined those from No.7 Pit. There were three main districts in this pit, the main east, the lower east and the Penrhys district. These districts were not ventilating districts as defined by the Act but were under separate firemen.

There were 156 men employed in the No.6 Pit, 894 in the No.7 Pit and 430 in the No.8 Pit, a total for the mine of 1,480. Of this total 1,050 worked on the day shift. There was no regular night shift on the coal but some of the colliers worked at night in special places repairing. The managing staff comprised Mr. David Hannah, the agent and general manager of the Ferndale Collieries ad who also acted as the manager of the No.8 Pit. Mr. J.W. Evans was the manager of the Nos.6 and 7 Pits and Mr. John Jones the undermanager of the No.7 Pit. Mr. David Griffiths was the undermanager of the No.8 Pit and Horace Thompson undermanager of the No.6 Pit. In addition, there was day overman and a night overman in the No.7 Pit and a day overman in the No.8 Pit. There were 11 firemen on the day shift and 10 in the night shift in all the pits.

In common with all the larger and deeper collieries in South Wales, the workings in all the seams are naturally dry and dusty. A few years before the disaster a system of watering the roadways by sprays was introduced in the No.7 Pit and the same system had been extended a short time before to the No.8 Pit. The water was obtained from the lodge rooms in the shafts and was taken to the workings in two-inch pipes. At the date of the explosion, 6,500 yards were land in the main roads in No.7 Pit and 1,900 yards in the No.8. Sprays were fixed to the pipes which were one inch in diameter at distances varying from 20 or 30 yards to 80 or 90 yards according to the air currents. The pipes and fittings were in charge of a special man in each shift in the No.7 Pit and another on the day shift at No.8 Pit during the night shift in this pit. Besides these men, there were several others, firemen, master hauliers and riders on the engine planes who had keys by which they could turn the sprays on or off. The man who attended the pipes in the No.8 Pit had been off work during the week prior to the disaster and the man who had taken his place did not attend the inquiry as he could not be located. At the time there was no statutory obligation on owners to provide water sprays to keep the dust down. Where the pipes did not reach, water barrels were provided and the hauliers spread water on the floors. Where blasting was done, the place of the firing and other places within a radius of 20 yards was supposed to be watered by casks and buckets which were filled from the nearest piping. The Inspector commented:

Such watering as this would not be likely to wet all parts of the roof and sides where dust collects unless it was carefully carried out and several casks of water used for each shot. Indeed it was clear that little watering had been done where the shots were fired. Probably the fact that safety explosive was used, led officials to place more reliance on the explosives that they ought to have done and so they did not think it necessary to much watering.

The explosion occurred when there were few men in the pits at the interval between two shifts. A repairing shift which included several colliers had descended the pit at 10.30 p.m. on Sunday after the usual inspection of the night firemen who had gone down about 8.30 a.m. These firemen and many who were on the night shift had only just come up when the explosion took place. All the day fireman with the exception of the one in the No.6 Pit descended the pits from 4.20 to 4.30 a.m. and six of these men were killed. It was believed that 58 men were in the No.7 Pit, 12 in No.6 Pit and 20 in No.8 Pit making a total of 90. Of these, 30 escaped uninjured, 3 were injured and 25 were killed. Everyone in the Nos.6 and 8 lost their lives.

Of those who escaped from the No.7 Pit, 29 came from the east side into which the explosion did not pass further than 270 yards where it was arrested. The men in this side of the pit had little difficulty in making their way out of the pit. The only other man who escaped uninjured was Roderick Williams, the day foreman in the Penrhys District of the Four Feet seam, west side. He stated that he was making his morning inspection and was at the face when the explosion occurred. He said:

I heard reports like great falls but I thought it was an explosion. I took a look at my watch and saw it was twenty-three minutes to six. I felt a check in the wind and the air stopped. I tried to make my way out by the return and arrived at the doors in No.12 heading. I found these doors partly blown towards the rise intake and the firedamp was so strong in the intake that I retreated into the return. Failing to get out by way of the return, I went up the old road to the rise of the return, where the air was fresher, and waited there until 11 a.m. The afterdamp became so strong there that I made another attempt to get out and this time, finding it better in the intake, I succeeded in getting out that way passing over several falls, until I was met by the first exploring party coming in.

The Inspector commented that:

This man displayed considerable judgement and coolness, and to these qualities, he owes his life. Had he rushed thoughtlessly out by another road, he would have certainly lost his life in the afterdamp.

On the three rescued alive, but injured, two were enginemen and were found near the bottom of No.7 shaft but both were burned. The other, a collier named Griffith Phillips, aged 24 years, was found at the entrance to Canon’s heading in No.9 district Four Feet seam, at a point 1,200 yards from the shaft. Four others were found dead, lying beside him and it was only by the treatment of his rescuers including Dr. Morris, the medical doctor, at the collieries that he was rescued alive.

The explosion was heard all over the village of Tylorstown and a dust-laden blast followed by dense smoke was seen to come up the three shafts but there were no flames seen. The covering of the fan drift was blown off but fortunately, the fan was not damaged. The cages at the No.7 Pit were slightly damaged but the damaged guide ropes were quickly replaced and Mr. Hannah, who arrived at the pit top about 6.30, descended with others as soon as possible on the cover of the cage. After considerable difficulty, they reached the bottom and found broken trams and debris heaped up in the shaft. They had been blown from the west side. Near the shaft, they found a number of dazed men but most were not injured. They also found the two men from the east side already referred to and the two injured enginemen lying in the cabin.

After repeated attempts to enter the cross measure drift leading to the Six Feet seam, and the west level in the Four Feet seam, Mr. Hannah was informed that a man was believed to have been left behind in the east side and he and the fireman went in and found a collier working away at the face when he was told he said that he had felt nothing wrong. On returning tote shaft, they found that a fireman had succeeded in entering the Six Feet workings after an air crossing on the cross measure drift had been temporarily replaced, and bypassing over a large fall which ad blocked the road before. This fall was estimated to be over 600 tons. They were unable to travel far east or west along the Six Feet level because of the afterdamp, but they reached Blacker’s dip which they got down after great difficulty and reached the bottom of the No.8 Pit with only one lamp alight.

While these attempts were going on, active steps were brought into effect by the Ferndale managers, undermanager and firemen to reach the workings by the other shafts. Between 10 and 11 a.m., the first descent was made at No.6 Pit (upcast) and in a very short time they found that all the 12 men in the Five Feet seam had been killed. Nine of the bodies were burned and death had come from carbon monoxide poisoning. They found that several lamps were burning near to the bodies. There was no sign of burning in these workings and the force that damaged the doors came from the staple pit by which the intake air current reached them. From the position of the bodies, it was obvious that the men had moved about after the explosion and it was thought that it was unfortunate that there was no official with them at the time to tell them to go through the doors to the Ferndale No.5 pit where they would have been safe, Two of them were found 70 yards from their working places and near the doors leading to safety. On the day of the explosion, the Inspector arrived at the colliery found that the colliery had been explored and most of the bodies had been recovered. The following day he made an inspection of the mine with his assistants.

Those killed in the No.6 Pit:

  • John Watkins aged 33 years, collier, single.
  • James Evans aged 38 years, ostler, left a wife and 7 children.
  • James Edwards aged 35 years, collier, left a wife and 3 children.
  • Henry Wiltshire aged 17 years, collier, single.
  • Evan Morgan aged 34 years, collier, widower with 4 children.
  • Abraham Charles aged 29 years, collier, left a wife and four children.
  • Daniel Reardon aged 24 years, labourer, left a wife.
  • Lewis Williams aged 19 years, collier, single.
  • Charles Norman aged 22 years, labourer, single.
  • James Jackson aged 25 years, collier, single.
  • Alfred Beecham aged 15 years, collier.
  • Henry Davies aged 25 years, labourer, single.

Others who died in the disaster:

  • David Harries or Harris, aged 49 years, collier, wife and 4 children.
  • Henry Harries or Harris, aged 19 years, collier, single.
  • John Lewis aged 39 years, fireman, wife and 6 children.
  • James Sutton aged 38 years, ostler, wife and child.
  • Sidney Davies aged 37 years, haulier, wife and 3 children, single.
  • George Jones aged 19 years, labourer, single.
  • George Gardner aged 25 years, ostler, single.
  • George Stapleton aged 54 years, ostler, wife and 6 children.
  • Richard Davies aged 34 years, collier, wife and 4 children.
  • Samuel Williams aged 32 years, collier, left a wife.
  • George Lewis aged 50 years, labourer, wife and 2 children.
  • John Collins aged 27 years, master haulier, single.
  • Richard D. Evans aged 28 years, fireman, left a wife.
  • Jacob Elias Jones aged 18 years, collier, single.
  • Gwilym Jones aged 29 years, collier, wife and 3 children.
  • William Rees Jenkins aged 39 years, collier, wife and 7 children.
  • Walter Barrett aged 17 years, collier, single.
  • David Rosser aged 41 years, fitter, single.
  • David Davies aged 26 years, master haulier, wife and 3 children.
  • David Williams aged 22 years, haulier, single.
  • Edwin Williams aged 20 years, labourer, single.
  • Thomas Hall aged 17 years, labourer, single.
  • Thomas Davies aged 18 years, collier, single.
  • Griffith Jenkins aged 35 years, haulier.
  • Isaac Pride aged 19 years, labourer.
  • John Thomas aged 37 years, collier.
  • Joseph Williams aged 20 years, rider, single.
  • Robert Sanders or Saunders aged 30 years, ostler, widowed.
  • Samuel Morgan aged 21 years, haulier, lived with widowed mother.
  • Amos Pritchard or Richards aged 46 years, haulier, wife and child.
  • Solomon Davies aged 25 years, collier single.
  • Albert Olding aged 20 years, collier.
  • Benjamin Phillips aged 52 years, fireman, wife and 6 children.
  • John Rowlands aged 21 years, collier, single.
  • Richard Evans aged 48 years, fireman, wife and 5 children.
  • Jesse Evans aged 52 years, fireman, wife and 2 children.
  • David Davies, wife and 7 children.
  • George Groves, wife and 2 children.
  • Alfred Jackson aged15 years, single.
  • David Jones aged 27 years, single.
  • David Jones aged 22 years, single.
  • John Pearce aged 64 years, wife and 5 children.
  • David Lewis aged 22 years, single.
  • Thomas Scourfield aged 32 years, wife and 3 children.
  • Richard Thomas aged 35 years, wife and 2 children.

Those injured:

  • Arthur Brodie aged 28 years, engine driver,
  • Eddy Williams aged 18 years, engine driver,
  • Griffth Phillips.

The inquest was held by the coroner forte district Mr. R.J. Rhys at Tylorstown on the 18th February and lasted for six days. All interested parties were represented and the report was presented to the Secretary of State for the Home Department. Evidence was heard about the state of the mine prior to the disaster from workmen and expert witnesses and the Inspector gave a detailed description of the mine after the explosion.

He found two shots, one in the ripping of David Evan’s stall which had been prepared by Evans, a collier, on the Thursday before the explosion. the hole was two feet four inches long and charged with one cartridge of what was described as “the last new powder” which was probably Bellite. This shot remained unfired until Sunday and on The Saturday the fireman told Evans that “there was gas there”. William Arthur, a night fireman, had refused to fire the shot because he found gas. After the disaster the shot was found fired by the shot had not done all its work and there was only a small portion of the roof brought down.

The other shot that was found, was in the rippings in Daniel William’ stall and was prepared by him on Friday afternoon. He stated that it was bored about twenty-seven inches and charged with one cartridge of Ammonite and stemmed with the borings from the hole. The night fireman and his assistant, William Douglas saw the shot prepared but did not fire it because of a blower in Skyrme’s stall. The shot was not fired on Saturday morning and the day shift fireman. Richard Evans said he “did not know there was shot there”. Richard Evans body was the last to be recovered for the pit and was found within eight feet of the shot in William’s stall.

The inspector came to the conclusion that the primary cause of the explosion was the firing of this shot and went on to say:

An explosion once started in a colliery of this description would certainly extend generally throughout the workings where there was a coal dust n suspension or deposited on the surfaces of the roadways especially where there was active ventilation passing through large roadways of large dimensions as in this pit.

With regard to watering and the use of explosives he went on to say:

It seems necessary to remind managers of collieries that the introduction of explosives of a safer description does not make it less necessary to properly carry out all the regulations as to the examination of the places where shots are to be fired and all accessible places contiguous thereto, as well as any place in the ventilating districts in which firedamp may have been found “at other of the four inspections under Rule Four last recorded”. A grave responsibility rests with the “competent person” appointed by the manager to the owner to make these inspections, and none but thoroughly reliable and careful men should be appointed. These men are permitted by law to fire a shot when and where in their opinion, it is safe for firing.

In the light of the present knowledge as to the inflammability of small percentages of gas and their increased danger when coal dust if present, it seems to me that no shot should never be attempted to be fired where the slightest indication of gas, by a “cap” on the safety lamp, can be detected. Similarly I think no shot should be fired in any ventilating district in which there happens to be an accumulation of firedamp.

The Coroner summed up and the jury retired to consider their verdict. They returned and delivered the following verdict:

We are of the opinion that the cause of the explosion was the firing of a shot in gas in Daniel William’s road in No.8 Pit and that the air passing through the faces was charged with gas and probably came into contact with a film of gas in Daniel William’s road and the explosion was accelerated by coal dust. We are of the opinion that no one now living is responsible for the explosion.

We recommend that a competent man be appointed to fire all the shots, one man on each shift. We are of the opinion that a practical and competent undermanager by appointed to have sole charge of the night shift in each pit. We are surprised to understand for the evidence of H.M. Inspector have no made a thorough and systematic inspection of No.8 Pit during the last fifteen months and we also recommend that practical working men be appointed as assistant inspectors of mines.

At the end of his report Mr. Robson commented:

With reference to the recommendation of the jury that shot men should be appointed. I have respectfully to say that in my opinion, a fireman is a suitable man to perform the duties of a shotman but before any shot is attempted to be fired in a ventilation district the whole of the district should first be carefully examined and then if safe any shots to be fired should be fired by the fireman acting as shotman, commencing with the shot nearest the return end of his district.

I am also of the opinion that all shots fired in dry dusty mines or those that produce firedamp, should be fired with an electric battery.

With reference to the expression of surprise on the part of the jury that no complete and systematic inspection of the No.8 Pit by the Inspectors of Mines had been made for the last eighteen months, I have to explain that, though I stated at the inquiry that their inspections of portions of the No.8 Pit had been made during the last years, I have since found, from reports in my possession, that one of these was made in January 1895 by the late Mr. J.M. Sims was not a complete inspection. At the same time, I most respectfully submit that even if no complete inspection of this colliery had been made, it would not, in my view of inspection, be a matter for surprise; I think the making of complete inspections ought to be left as at present, to the discretion of the Inspector in charge. A colliery might be inspected from end to end one week and found satisfactory, it would probably be left uninspected for a longer period as under the present system of more frequent inspections and, the changes that are going on in collieries, such as complete inspections would not in my opinion, tend to the discovery of illegal practices or contraventions of the Act nearly so well as the present system.

 

REFERENCES
The Mines Inspectors Report.
Report to the Right Honourable The Secretary of State for the Home Department on the Explosion at Tylorstown Colliery of the 27th January 1896 by Robert Woodfall, Esq., and J.T. Robson, Esq., Inspector of Mines for the South Wales District.
The Colliery Guardian, 31st January 1895, p.217.
”And they worked us to death” Vol.1. Ben Fieldhouse and Jackie Dunn. Gwent Family History Society.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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