BIGNALL HILL. Jamage Pit. Audley, Staffordshire. 25th. November, 1911.

The colliery was the property of the Bignall Hill Colliery Company and consisted of a group of three pits, the Jamage Main, the Jamage and the Rookery mines. Before the accident these three were connected below ground but since the disaster the Rookery Pits have been shut off from the other workings by a stopping. The Jamage and the Jamage Main were still connected but the No.1 District in the Bullhurst seam, at the Jamage mine was also shut off from the workings by a stopping.

The manager, Mr. Amos Daniels, was appointed in March 1910 and he had an undermanager and an overman of the Jamage mine only. They were Mr. James Boon, undermanager who was appointed in July 1908, and the overman, Mr. William Swingewood who was appointed in April 1910.

The seams that were encountered at the Jamage mine where the Seven Feet, at 75 yards, the Eight Feet at 145 yards, the Bullhurst at 250 feet and the Ten Feet at 280 yards. The shaft was sunk in 1872 and a section of the shaft had to be prepared for the inquiry as up to that date there had not been one. The ventilation of the mine was provided by a Waddell fan placed on the surface at the top of the upcast shaft.

The explosion took place in the Bullhurst seam which varied in thickness and inclination from as much a 6 feet to 20 feet and from flat to an inclination of 60 degrees. The seam was divided by bands of shale into four layers of coal the Bottoms was the most important part of the seam and that in which the roads were driven and there was also the “Middles”, the “Little Tops” and the “Big Bottoms.” The bands of shale varied in thickness but the “hussle” which separated the Middles from the Little Tops was on note. It contained a highly carbonaceous shale and was from three inches to five feet thick.

Throughout Staffordshire the seam had a notorious reputation for spontaneous combustion and for gas. The seam, therefore, presented demanded the greatest skill and the exercise of the greatest care in mining it, if it was to be worked safely.

The manager stated that the part of the seam that gave the most trouble from heating was the Bottom coal. When there was “warmth in the coal” there was also present a band of soft substance almost like black lead from 3 to 5 inches thick. When this happened and heating took place the practice was to cut down the band and fill it away. The Hussle in North Staffordshire was also considered troublesome in this respect but the manager said he had never seen it heating in the Jamage mine.

The coal was worked on a modification of the bord and pillar system and consisted of driving roads in the Bottom coal to form roughly rectangular pillars of various dimensions. These roads were driven about eight feet wide but owing to the coal crushing at the sides they were frequently 12 feet wide. The coal in these roads or ‘openings’ was taken down to the Little Tops as it was found that this usually made a good roof.

The mine was not laid out in a definite, planned system. The roads were irregular and the districts large and straggling and this made the fighting of possible gob fires, more difficult and this was the main area of investigation at the inquiry. The manager at the time of the disaster was not responsible for the laying out of the part of the mine where the disaster took place as he had been on his post only since March 1910.

The pillars were worked on the retreating system and slices, 12 yards wide were taken for the full length. When the slice had been taken, the timber supporting the roof as set to the Little Tops and would be from 6 to 20 feet in length. This was withdrawn and the Little Tops allowed to fall, or was taken down and as much of the coal as possible was recovered with supports being set up at the same time to the Big Tops. Finally, the Big Tops were taken down and loaded. The manager stated that this system was successful in extracting the coal and colliers were paid to search among the fallen Little Tops and dirt to recover the fallen coal. He did not think them amount of coal that was lost exceeded five percent of the total.

The ventilation system of the Bignall Hill Colliery was complicated. At the Rookery Mine there was an exhausting Schiele fan, 10 feet in diameter which ventilated the Rookery mine independently of the Jamage mine. A small portion of the Jamage workings were ventilated by leakage through the Eight Feet goaf from the Rookery intake and a portion of the return air from the Rookery went to the Jamage upcast shaft. The Inspector commented that all the ventilation roads should be capable of being travelled for inspections and they were not in this case. This was not a very satisfactory way of ventilation.

The total quantity of air passing into the Jamage mine was 74,126 cubic feet per minute and was made up as follows, 49,960 cubic feet passed down the Jamage downcast shaft, 3,520 cubic feet entered the Rookery mine and 20,646 cubic feet entered from the Jamage mine. From the records of the ventilation for 10th October there seemed to have been ample air for the ventilation of the Jamage mine. The safety lamps that were used at the colliery were single gauze bonneted Clanny types manufactured by Messrs. Johnson, Clapman and Morris.

Except in the No.3 Bullhurst, there was one coal getting shift. The colliers descended about 5.20 a.m. and the day shift firemen going down in the first cage. With the colliers, repairers, lads and others, there were about 124 people employed in the Bullhurst during the 24 hours and they were supervised by a day and a night fireman.

Coal tubs were filled day and night in the No.3 Bullhurst and the night firemen, or examiners as they were known locally, made their statutory examination of the workings before the start of work. This examination was carried out towards the end of their shift and they reached the surface in time to report to the day firemen. The Report Book for the No.1 Bullhurst was kept in a cabin which was a recess in the road not far from the bottom of the shaft. The other books were kept in the office at the pit bottom. The disaster occurred in the No.1 Bullhurst and the book was not available at the inquiry. Evidence was called to show that it must have been washed away by the flooding operations which were carried out after the explosion. A search was made and eventually it was found under several inches of dust at the site of the cabin.

The information in the book proved to be meagre but there were a number of reports that indicated the presence of gas. That of Charles Smith for December 18th reported gas at the top end of the Eight Feet and the general safety as ‘not safe’. On the morning of the explosion, Brindley, the fireman of the No.1 Bullhurst reported the district as ‘safe’ when they were engaged in sealing off a portion of it, something the Inquiry found strange to say the least.

The fire started near Taylor’s place in the No.1 Bullhurst district where the pillars were being stripped. The seam at this point was 350 yards from the surface and was very thick, being about 22 feet 9 inches high. The inclination was about 1 in 5 but it had begun to flatten out where the fire was supposed to have existed. The pillars had been removed to the dip and leaving a rising goaf behind.

There were five roads leading to the place, two of which had been stopped off and there were three partially built stoppings had been put in three of the other roads but they had allowed sufficient room for the passage for horses, tubs and workmen. The preparation of the stoppings was the usual practice when working this seam in North Staffordshire owing to the liability of spontaneous combustion. These permanent stopping were 3 feet thick and were recessed into the sides for two or three yards, that is, until the coal was found as the coal at the side was very broken up and recessed into the floor. The roof was hard and firm and the stopping were not cut into this. At this colliery it was the practice to first put in a stone pack, 8 to 10 yards thick and then face the stopping with bricks and mortar to make it stronger. The reason that three roads were left open was that one could act as an intake, the middle one the haulage road and the third as a return.

The first indication that all was not well at Taylor’s place was on Thursday morning, 23rd. November. The manager was making an inspection of the Jamage mine when he received a note from Swingewood, the overman asking him to come down to Smith’s district and Taylor’s place where there was a peculiar smell.

He arrived there about 11 a.m. but could not detect the smell but he found that the coal was warm. He examined the goaf and could detect no gob stink but others, notably George Taylor, a coal hewer who was working in the place and had observed the smell at intervals. Alfred Taylor, who was also working there and Brindley, the fireman who inspected the place on Thursday morning reported that it gave off ‘a little smell’ but, although there were signs that something was wrong, neither he nor Smith, the day fireman reported the heating of the coal on Thursday. Reuben Riley, a roadman, was working in the return airway on Friday and noticed the gob stink as he went to work at 6 a.m. on Friday and thought that it was coming from a stopping.

There was a small fault at Taylor’s place which had a down throw towards the goaf 1 foot 6 inches. Daniels and Swingewood discussed the matter and came to the conclusion that whatever heating here was, was due to the pressure or crush on the coal pillar and that the best thing to do would be to take out the warm coal as quickly as possible and work was commenced immediately. On Friday morning the coal at this point was considerably cooler than it was the day before but the manager had detected gob stink at the edge of the goaf.

He arranged for the stoppings to be closed and ordered the men out of the pit with the exception of those engaged in building the stoppings and conveying materials for their construction. There were twenty-two people in all. He also arranged for the necessary changes to the ventilation. Curiously, when he visited the edge of the goaf on Friday at 6 p.m., the Manager could not detect a smell and the coal was cooler. At 7 p.m., he heard loud bumps or ‘goths’ as they were called locally which he accounted for by the weighting of the roof and he noticed that the timber was bending and cracking. The closing of the stoppings was commenced at about 7 a.m. On Friday morning and continuous work went on until the explosion which took place on the 25th November at about 10 a.m.

Harry Meyer was working with others close to the dirt pack which they had carried up to the roof and were strengthening it when the blast occurred. He heard a roar which came from the inbye side of the pack and he was struck by debris and knocked out. He was also slightly burned. Reuben Riley gave a similar story. Kelsall was about 30 yards from the stopping and was also knocked out and burnt a little.

At stoppings Nos. 7 and 8, George Billington, a fireman observed nothing unusual except that the gob stink was coming through the stopping No.7 until 10.15 a.m., when he felt a rush of wind followed by clouds of dust and he turned to Henry Shaw who was working with him and told him that he thought they ought to get out. John Robinson, a fireman working on the No.3 stopping noticed a reversal of the air seconds before the blast and shouted a warning to the men. He sent off to get out but lost consciousness. Charles Smith, the day fireman, was also rendered unconscious as he was trying to get out.

Boon, the undermanager, who had been making an inspection of the stoppings, had just returned from No.4 and was standing about four yards from No.5 when he felt a rush of wind carrying a cloud of dust. Boon had seen gas coming from No.4 stopping and this was blown out in the explosion.

The rescue operations we carried out speedily and with a manner that gave great credit to all concerned. The manager had just reached his home when he was summoned by Robert Brough, the onsetter. When he got to the pit he telephoned Mr. Henshaw asking him to provide two rescue brigades equipped with breathing apparatus and gave Daniel Gater the names of the men who were well acquainted with the district. He told him to find these men and send them down the pit after him. He then went down the mine and made his way to the workings.

There he found Mr. Latham, the surveyor, at the pit bottom just conscious and in charge of two men. He instructed the two me to take Latham up and send for doctors. He made his way inbye and found Roberts and Smith. Both these men were able to get out of the pit unaided. Later he met James Boon, the undermanager and his own son, Amos Dnailes, pushing a tub which contained three men

Those who lost their lives were:

  • F. Leese aged 58 years.
  • T. Chadwick aged 45 years.
  • Enoch Edwards aged 51 years, fireman.
  • Joseph Singlewood aged 20 years dataller
  • G. Cork aged 22 years, dataller
  • Henry Shaw aged 21 years, dataller

The inquiry was opened at the Wesleyan Schools, Audley on 4th. January 1912 and the evidence was heard by the Coroner for North West Staffordshire, Mr. Adam Hughes. All interested parties were represented and the official report was present to the Secretary of State on 6hth. March 1912.

The Report books and the information contained in them were considered by the inquiry who came to the conclusion that:

There was a want of system in carrying out the reporting required under General Rule 7 inasmuch as reports had been made on several occasions by firemen in the books under General Rule 4 to the effect that places had been fenced off on account of the presence of firedamp but the workmen had not been withdrawn or the “gob sink had been discovered” which reports should have been recorded under General Rule 7 in the Withdrawal Book, but this had not been done. The manager admitted that he had not examined the latter book.

The Coroner submitted three questions for the consideration of the jury:

  1. The cause of death.
  2. was the mine worked according to the accepted practice of the district?
  3. Were the stoppings put in with reasonable care and rapidity, and with due precaution to keep them airtight?

The jury found:

  1. The cause of death was asphyxia due to carbon monoxide poisoning.
  2. That the mine was worked according to the accepted practice.
  3. That the stoppings were put in with reasonable care &c. but the jury were of the opinion that the preparatory stoppings should have first been bricked in.

The jury also added a rider:

That where a gob fire has taken place, a rescue brigade should be at the colliery in case of an emergency.

 

REFERENCES
Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department on the causes and circumstances attending the Explosion in the Jamage Pit of the Bignall Hall Colliery on Saturday 25th November 1911, by R.A.S. Redmayne, H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines.
Colliery Guardian, 1st December 1911, p.1090, 22nd December, p.1249, 12th January 1912, p.90.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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