BIRCHENWOOD. Kidsgrove, Staffordshire. 18th. December, 1925.

The colliery was n North Staffordshire near Kidsgrove and it had been worked for thirty years by the Birchenwood Colliery Company, Limited but in June 1925 it had been taken over by the Kidsgrove Collieries, Limited. It employed 1,126 people underground and at the time of the explosion, there were 374 below.

At the time of the explosion, there were five shafts and one footrail in use for pumping, winding and ventilation. Two of these were upcast shafts and then another two and the footrail were downcast shafts. The main shaft was called the No.18 and it was the only shaft that was used to wind coal. It was a downcast shaft and wound about five to six thousand tons of coal a week.

Over the years, thirteen seams of coal had been worked at the colliery but at the time there were only three that were being worked. These were the Seventh Feet Banbury, the Eight Feet Banbury and the Bullhurst Seams. These were inclined throughout the mine and were generally steep, but in the part of the mine where the explosion took place they were inclined at about 450 and dipped to the south-east.

The No.18 Pit was sunk to the Silver Mine Seam at a depth of 440 yards and a cross measure drift, or crut, had been driven south-east of the shaft and this passage intersected the Winpenny, Bullhurst, Eight Feet Banbury, Seven Foot Banbury, and other seams. In the Seven feet Banbury Seam, a breadth of coal was being developed by inclines driven in the seam to almost the full dip at 948 yards below the surface and from these dips the district known as Wakefield’s dip, the distance from the bottom of the shaft to the start of Wakefield’s dip was 1, 338 yards. The explosion took place in Wakefield’s Dip District of the Seven Foot Banbury Seam.

Past experience had shown that the Seven Feet Seam, as well as the Eight Feet Bullhurst Seam, were subject to spontaneous heating. Records that had been kept over the previous twenty eight years showed that there had been no less than twenty-one districts that head been sealed off because of spontaneous combustion. Four of these were in the Bullhurst, five in the Eight Feet and twelve in the Seven Feet but none of these incidents had caused loss of life.

The Seven Feet was ten feet thick with a strong roof but a weak floor that lifted, causing a disintegration of the coal which exposed a large area of coal to the oxidizing action of the air. The seam was gassy but with adequate ventilation, there was no major problem from the gas.

The workings were dry and dusty and it had been worked by three methods; a modified longwall system, a breasting system and the heading and drifting or “Rearer” system. At the time of the disaster, the seam in Wakefield’s Dip was worked on the latter system. It worked in two stages, the heading stage was called the “Bottom Shunt” section and the drifting stage was the upper panel or the “Top Shunt”. The heading stage consisted of driving out a pair of opening levels about 10 to 15 yards apart to the boundary, the lower one being the main level and the upper one tot he air heading. From these roadways at distances varying from 80 to 120 yards, pairs of dips were driven to a boundary, goaf, upper levels or a barrier to form panels of workings. By this means the panel was split into pillars for 10 to 12 yards thick which were worked by drifting starting at the top of the panel and worked downwards to the main level. The system of working highly inclined thick seams had been used for many years and was originally developed as a safe and economical way of extracting the coal.

As time went by and the seams started to be worked at greater depths and the problem of spontaneous combustion in the goaf became apparent. This was not a problem if an oxygen-starved atmosphere could be maintained in the goaf. A further development in the “Rearer” system of working to keep an inert atmosphere of firedamp in the goaf. To do this the dips from which the pillars were formed were terminated at a distance from the lower level of the old panel above so that a substantial barrier of the coal was left on the rise side of a new panel. There were two roads into the new panel which were in the lowest outbye corner.

In Wakefield’s Dip District there was a variation of this system so that the “Top Shunt” section was cut through by two old roadways which had been sealed by stoppings at the top right-hand corner. the “Rearer” system had an advantage, since if there was a fire, it could rapidly be isolated by two stoppings and only a single panel of coal would be lost and in the early stages of development, openings were made for the stoppings and materials to complete the stoppings were constantly close at hand. The stoppings could be completed without delay when the coal in the panel was exhausted.

One of the two panels in Wakefield’s Dip District, the “Top Shunt” panel was near complete exhaustion. Only six small pillars remained to be worked above the air heading and three larger ones along the head side of the main level. A jig or self-acting incline, which as known as Kelsall’s Dip, was used in the output of the working places of which there were three and all came down from it. The stage of extracting the pillars had not been reached and there was a goaf covering five acres inbye and above the pillars that were being worked in Kelsall’s Dip.

The explosion occurred on the afternoon shift at about 4.15 p.m. somewhere in the neighbourhood of Kelsall’s Dip in the Top Shunt panel. There were five colliers at work in three places in the district at the time and two other colliers were repairing the air heading near to Wakefield’s back dip.

During the morning there had been no indication of heating and the work had gone on normally but at about 1 p.m, towards the end of the shift, Gerrard Harris Forrester, an assistant surveyor, who had been working in another part of the pit in the morning, decided to go down the West Winpenny Back Slant before going to the surface to see how some repair work was proceeding. On passing through the separation doors at the bottom of the No.18 Pit, he noticed an unusual smell in the air. He met Albert Hughes, a spare fireman who was temporally working as a repairer in the slant, and together they went to make an examination of the airway at the top of Wakefield’s District. They found no gas but there was still a smell.

The first official that they saw was George Wilcox who had been round the district on his morning inspection, including the back dip in Wakefield’s district and had noticed no “gob stink”. He received Forrester’s report and told him to go and tell George William Lowe, the undermanager. Wilcox went to explore the return airway.

Forrester met Lowe at the top of the west slant and both went with Wilcox to the West Slant return. This was at about 2.05 p.m. and at the top they met the day shift with the day fireman just getting out of the train in which they had ridden up the incline. They had found nothing wrong on their journey and they had smelt nothing. The smell that alarmed Forrester and Hughes a little earlier had disappeared. They retraced their steps and noticed nothing to cause them any worry and when they reached the top of Wakefield’s back dip, Forrester apologised for raising a false alarm. He was now convinced that there had been no smell.

There was now no reason why the afternoon shift could not be allowed to go to their work. The furnaceman Amos Whalley, was told of the inspections that had been made and went to look to see if there was anything wrong with the brattice cloths or with the ventilation. The explosion occurred two and a half to three hours later.

At the moment of the explosion, Amos Whalley, the fireman, was in Ball’s place, which was a heading that was being widened with the object of removing the pillar on the rise side of it. At the inquiry he gave a detailed account of the events that followed:

While I was there, I should be there two or three minutes; I tested for gas and found none. I got on the load and got right into the top and tested for gas and found none. During that time I examined the face and drew his attention that he wanted a post set. He said: “We will have some coal out first.” I said: “See you get one up”.

I examined his face and we heard a fall of rock in the gob, accompanied by a rush of air, and Ball said: “What is that?” I said: “A fall of rock.” It went down the waste and beyond Ball’s place rolling and slipping over one another like great sheets. Ball, as he stood close to me, shouted “Fire”. Somebody shouted “Fire” and the job then occurred. We were all put in the dark. I do not think I lost consciousness. We gathered ourselves up, after being blown down a time or two, and got on the landing. I called to Grocott, but could get no answer. I also called to Owens but got no answer. Bell was in the dip, he fell just like this. I had to drag him along and get him down as well as I could. I delivered him to Enoch Winkle and Charlie Armitt and asked them to give him a hand up.

The fireman and ball had great difficulty in finding their way down Kelsall’s Dip to the level but the six people who were in the workings on the return side of Ball’s place were killed. One of them, Caton, who was repairing the air heading with another man, was blown through the air door in the thirling into the “Top Shunt” level. The other bodies were not recovered for several months, and Ball who was suffering from severe burns finally died from his injuries.

Four youths in the main level were slightly injured and none of the fifteen people working in the bottom shunt level suffered at all except some were affected by afterdamp.

A rescue party was quickly organised, but by the time it reached the bottom of Kelsall’s dip all further hope of rescue had evaporated for there the party found a fire. A tub of coal which was standing at the bottom of the dip was alight and the fire had spread up the side of the dip igniting the timber and coal. Strenuous efforts were made through the night and on into the morning by the Rescue Brigades and later by relays of helpers. They tried to put out the fire but without any marked success and after a consultation with the owners and the Inspector of Mines, it was decided to seal the working by stoppings in the intake and the return dips. There was no hope for the men left behind and there was great danger to the men who were down the pit fighting the fire. Temporary stoppings were rapidly erected in the two dips and the work was completed early in the afternoon of the same day.

Five bodies remained in the explosion area when the place was sealed off. The stoppings were started at 10.45 a.m. on the day after the disaster and were completed by 2 p.m. by men wearing rescue apparatus. All the persons were then withdrawn and it was decided not to approach the stoppings for 30 hours.

An inspection of the stoppings was made at 8 p.m. on Sunday when they were found intact and there was only a slight smell of burning timber at the return dip stopping. The dip stoppings were strengthened with brickwork and sand. Another inspection was made the following day and it was found that the mine was safe for the workmen to return and coal drawing was resumed on Tuesday morning.

In the meantime, plans had been made to explore the explosion area to recover the bodies. The operations started on the 4th January 1926 by three colliery Rescue Brigades working inside an airlock. This was installed in the West level between the tops of the intake and return dips and later advanced to the air heading which was originally the return from Kelsall’s Dip. The operations were completed by April 1st, 1926.

The recovery work to be performed was probably the most hazardous and arduous recorded in the annals of mining in this country, but it was carried through persistently and methodically in the face of great difficulty without a hitch or accident. Great credit was due to the rescue brigade, Mr. Allott, the agent of the colliery and his staff and officials.

The men who lost their lives were:

Body recovered 18th. March 1925:

  • Leonard Caton.

Bodies recovered 31st. March 1926:

  • Isaac Ball, 45
  • Leonard Caton, 32
  • Tom Grocott, 38
  • Fred Lowndes, 34
  • D. Owen, 35
  • John Owen, 32
  • Daniel Swingewood

 

  • Daniel Swingewood’s body was recovered 23rd February 1926
  • I. Ball who was rescued alive from the mine but died from his injuries 27th December 1925.

The inquiry into the causes of the disaster was made by Mr. F.W. Wynne, H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines who began his report:

My Inquiry having been postponed pending a settlement of the coal stoppage and, I regret to say, further delayed by personal ill health, was held, by arrangement with Hugh Worthington Adams. Esq., H.M. Coroner for the North-West District of Staffordshire, jointly with the adjourned inquest in the Victoria Hall, Kidsgrove, on the 20th, 21st and 22nd April 1927.

The inquest into the men’s deaths brought in the following verdict:

The cause of the explosion is apparently spontaneous combustion. We do consider that provisions of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, and the Regulations made thereunder have been duly carried out. We have no suggestions to offer with a view to obviating a similar disaster.

The evidence of Amos Whalley, the fireman and Edgar Threadgold, the hooker-on established that the seat of the explosion was somewhere in the goaf beyond the pillars on the left had side of Kelsall’s Dip. Just how far beyond was impossible to say but it was probably some yards beyond the area over which the ventilating current passed.

The source of ignition could be from blasting, friction from brake wheels or defective lamps. The first two possibilities were ruled out and the lamps were tested and were found to be a very unlikely source of ignition. The possibilities were narrowed down to three. Matches in the waste, frictional sparking from falling rock and heat due to spontaneous combustion. Matches were dismissed as a source of ignition and the possibility of sparks from falling rocks was considered possible. There was evidence that men had seen sparks when there were falls of e hard rock in the Seven Foot Banbury Seam and there was evidence for the work of Professor Wheeler that this was possible. The inquiry thought that this was unlikely in this explosion.

The possibility of coal dust contributing to the disaster was looked into and dismissed so that left spontaneous heating as a source of ignition. Mr. Wheeler thought this to be the case and since there were usually indications that heating was taking place, he looked to see if there had been any negligence in this case. He found there was not and as much had been done by the men and officials in the main as could be expected.

He was critical of the “Rearer” system of working and said:

I am unable to condemn it out and out but clearly, it is a method which leaves much to chance, and the time has come, I think, when possibilities of other or modified methods of working should be further explored, methods in which operations can be carried on with a greater degree of certainty as to the condition of the atmosphere in the goaf.

I am glad to be able to report that in reply to the questions as to the alternative methods of working, the Agent, Mr. J.R.L. Allott stated that the matter is being considered and he had in fact visited mines in Germany, where similar difficulties are encountered, with a view to studying the methods of working in vogue there and to see if any of them could be adapted to suit the conditions at Birchenwood.

 

REFERENCES
The report on the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Birchenwood Colliery.
Colliery Guardian, 29th April 1927, p.1003, 10th February, p.536, 17th February, p. 640, 16th March, p.1035.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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